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Men who must, at the time of the Raid, have been pretty 
well aware of the tr~e facts have evinced a marked disinclination 
to commit themselves upon this question of t. Colonial uffice 
complicity. 
Hence the importance of the Graham Bower Papers - for 
Bower who was, undoubtedly, in a position to have an inside 
knowledge or events gives a most definite answer to the 
question. "Were the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner 
~ 
implicated in the Jameson ~aid plot?n Moreover his answer, 
-
which is in the affirmative., does not seem unreasonable, when 
viewed in the light of already existing evidence - and, in the 
light of the blatant ineptitQde of the. Select Committee which 
acquited Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson. 
CH. 1. What detracts from the force of Bower's indictment is 
his justifiable but all-absorbing grie.vance against the 
Colonial Offi~e. Therefore it has been considered essential 
to establish, at the outset, that he was, above, all things, an 
~ 
upright and honest man. 
CH. 11. The vital rola of Rhodes inevitably obtrudes upon a 
discussion Gt any aspect e~ the dameson Raid; so, for the sake 
II I I 
of clarity the official version of this ro.le is described a~ 
succinctly as possible. Much labour has gone into debunking 
the manne.r in which the House of commons Committee, conducted 
it's Enquiry; in ofder to show that this Committee, far from 
genuinely trying to find out the truth, did it's utmost to 
·-
prevent the discovery of the truth - end, in order to create, 
in this way, a suitably suspicio~s atmosphere for the presentation 
of Bower's case against the Colonial Office. 
CH.lll. Bower's testimony i.s dealt with in fairly great detail 
and, wherever possible, is supported and supplemented, mainly 
by the interesting communications which passed between Rhode.s 
and his agents and between Chamberlain and his Under-Secretaries 
./ 
during_ the period August to December, 1895. Relevant evidence 
' given before the House of Commons Committee is also examined, 
in particular, the incredible interpretations which Rhodes• 
-
agents Flora Shaw and Harri.s placed upon their cables. When 
stating evidence 1the actual wording, even the exact punctuation, 
is most important and, in many instances no attempt has been. 
made to paraphrase: Bower~s words, or the contents of telegrams, 
letters and despatche.s. 
CH. lV. The final chapeer re.presents a determined, though 
perhaps unsuccessful, effort to sum. up the evidence as 
objectively as possible and, to this end, Bower's testimony 
has be.en stripped of all important and. unimportant _)mbellishments 
such as his interesting interpretation of the first phase of 
the Kruger-chamberlain issue, and his description of the 
remarkable. difference between Sir Hercules' pre-Raid and post-Raid 
.. 
estima~ons of Chamberlain. Moreover- it is taken for granted 
that criticism of the House of Commons Enquiry has been 
sufficiently exhaustive to warrant the assumption that statements 
made in defence al the Colonial Office, at the Enquiry, were 
not nece.ssarily accurate. Therefore:, in the summing up, the 
Proceedings and Report e~ the House of Commons Committee are 
disregarded and the. evidence is weighed purely on 1 t' s own 
merits. 
CHAPTER 1 • 
.BoU$Y __ Ac.~~~ tL~ c_.; n··- 0
1 
-I 
I '(. '::- 1 ' ' •. 
The Jameson Raid was an abortive at~empt to over-throw 
the government ot Paul Kruger. 
By the end of 1895, British annexations to the. North, 
the East and the West had all but completed the encirclement 
1 
ot the- Transvaal, but Kruger, with the tacit approval of the 
8 3 
Kaiser, was still holding his own, in spite of Clause lV ot 
4 
the London convention. This shrewd, but bigoted old man, his 
very "Dapper" tenacity of purpose well sustained by the immense 
. • . 5 
riches ot the Witwatersrand and by the acumen of Dr. Leyda, 
was not only the chief obstacle to Cecil Rhodes great ambition -
6 
a United South Africa, but a hindrance to Joseph Chamberlaint s 
7 
pursuance of an active Imperialist policy in Southern Africa, 
and a menace to the big profits of 
I, J .G. Macdonald - Rhodes, A Life .: lJ_927)- 61 - 119 ff 
~· 
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8 
the Johannesburg magnates, of whomRhodes was one. 
r~e.. 
The plan ot which the: Raid disaster was" unexpected outcome 
centred about the growing Uitlander agitation on the Rand ~o~ 
redress of their political, economic and social grievances, 
and the conversion of this purely constitutional agitation i.nto 
9 
a revolution. An armed force was to hold itself in readiness) 
on the border, to baek up the artifical1y instigated revolt and 
to uphold the High Commissioners arbitration, and, furthermore, 
to ensure that the revolutionaries did not attempt to. set upcm 
10 
independent Uitlander Republic. 
In it's initial stages this plan of Rhodes and his fellow 
conspirators met with fair success. The British south Africa 
Company acquired a strip of terri tory along the Transvaal 
11 
border and a force under Dr. Jameson and Sir John Willoughby 
12 
was assembled at Eitsani. on tba Rand, the reJection by the 
Volksraad of a monster petition, 
a. Hale - 31 -32 
R.I. Lovell - The Struggle for South Africa, 1875 - 1899 - 1934 
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Hale 27 - 30 
J.P. Fitzpatrick - The Transvaal trom Within - {!899] - 51 
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13 14. 
tor the franchise and the Dritts cri.sis gave considerable 
impetus to the anti-government agitation which the money or 
lS 
Rhode.s and Bei t was helping to· foment • 
A date was fixed for tha rising - December 28th; from 
the viewpoint of the Republican Government, a most opportune 
date, for Pretoria would be crowded with armed Boers who had come 
in for the Christmas Nagmaal. But tor many reasons - wanteot-
an able leader, the indifference ot large sections of the 
working class, inefficient revolutionary technique, general 
unpreparedness and an irreconcilable difference of opinion as 
to wnether the revolt should be carried out under the Vierkleur 
16 
or the. Union Jack - the revoluti.on "fizz.led out" and ._, 
Jameson who had been fidgeti.ng impatiently,on the border, took 
the indefensi.ble step of trying to pre.cipi tate a rising by 
17 
marching his force into the Transvaal. He carried with him 
a "covering" letter of invitation calling upon him to come 
to the aid of the women and children ~ 
13. J. Fitzpatrick - 400 
Nathan 323 
14. J. v.a. Poe1 836 
Walker 451 
15. Htlle 51 
J. Hays Hammond- 320 - 321 
Br. Se1. Com. Rep. - Leonard - 7893 
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17. S.G. Millin - 115 
Walker - 440 
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J. Hays Hammond - 341 - 349 
- 4 -
Johannesburg who ware at the mercy of the Boers. This he had, 




some five weeks before. 
When J·ameson surrended to General Cronje, at Doornkoop, 
this letter (it had been dated December 20th) and copious 
correspondence in connection with the Raid conspiracy, together 
with the necessary code-books were foWld in Major Robert 
19 
Whi tf!s black tttrommel" 
The J"ameson R~id ended all hopes of .federation in 
south Africa. for many years,and - in spite o.f having occasioned 
two criminal tri.al.s and two parliamentary enquiries, in spite 
of Blue Books and Green Books and a mass of contemporary 
literature - remains probably the most controversial episode 
in South Atrican history; one, to this day, partly shrouded 
in mystery, the subject of much speculation and bitter 
I 
dispute and, moreover, one about which a no less authorAttative 
work than Prof. E.A. Walker's History of South Africa could 
not be more non-committal. 
The most pro'Vocati.ve aspect of the Raid is the part 
played by the Colonial Office in the 
18. BR. SEL. COM. REP. - Leonard - 7874 - 7945 
19. m'JLE 45 - 48 
5 
whole miserable affair. Were Chamberlain and his colleagues 
implicated? j and, if so, to what extent? The Report of the 
Select Committee of the Rouse of Commons appointed to 
(I' 
investigate the circumstances of the.. Raid completely exonerate6 
the Colonial Office and it~s chief representative at the Cape -
20 
Sir Hercules Robinson. However W .L. Langer in his Diplomacy 
21 
at Imperialism and Cecil Headlmn in his chapter on the 
22 
Jameson Raid,in the Cambridge History of the British EmpireJ 
are not as convinced of the innocence of the Colonial secreta~· 
and are frankly skeptical of the innocence of the High 
Commissioner. Now, fifty years after the Raid, we find, on 
examining th~ papers of Sir Graham Bower, an indictment ot the 
Colonial Office which is particularly thorough going. 
Bower - the Imperial secretary at the cape, in 1895, 
was undoubtedly in a posttion to have an inside knowledge of 
events, during the months before and after the Raid. He was 
23 
not only in the confidence of Rhodes > but also of officials 
at the eolonial Office such as Sir Robert Meade and Edward 
Fairfield whom he saw constantly, during his two visits to 
,·:,... 24 
England,&allg 1896. Bower~s chief, Sir Hercules Robinson 
had, in 1889, retired as High Commissioner, only to be, to all 
intents and purposes) resurrected by ~hodes and Lord ~ipon 
. 25 
in January 1895 . Rhodes, after six years of Sir Henry Loch_, 
was a little weary of being thwarted. and Sir Hercules might be 
doddering, but he was, at least, a kindred spirit. Not that 
20. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. 
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the old man was senile - tar from it, but he was seventy-two 
years old and suffering from advanced cardiac degeneration and 
was therefore most dependent upon his Imperial secretary. In 
fact, he had agreed to accept another term of Office, only 
upon the condition that Bower, who was then due forpromotio~ 
remained at the cape and took over all the administrative work 
26 
attached to the High Commissioners's Office. Under those 
circumstances, even a less astute Imperial Secretary than 
Bower)would have been conscious of any subtle undercurrents 
in the High Commissioner's Office. 
In his evidence before the House of Commons Select 
Committee, Bower admitted his fore-knowledge of Rhodes 
I 
27 
plans. He was then overdue for promotion and there had been 
talk of the Governship of Newfoundland, but, at the conclusion 
139 7~"'~ of the Raid Enquiry, he was forced to resign from the 
.898~1colonial Service. A year later, the Colonial Office saw fit 
to re-employ him, but would not promote him. In fact, he was 
demoted and had to spend his remaining years,in the Colonial 
Service, as Imperial Secretary, on the obscure little island 
of Mauritius, where, no doubt, there was a great deal of time 
28 
to brood upon the injustices which had been meted out to him. 
Reading Bower's Reminiscences an.d his Letters, one is 
acutely aware both that he considers himself to have been most 
unfairly treated by the Colonial Office and 
20. Bower 196 
27. Br. Select. Com. Rep. -Bower- 2502 tt 
28. He was at that time the Senior K.G.M.G. in the Colonial 
Service. 
- ? 
that he is determined to provide for posterity an 
adequate justification of his conduct. But this is no 
reason for considering the Graham Bower Papers unworthy 
of carefUl study, for one is just as acutely aware that 
his obvious bias is very largely offset by his fundamental 
honesty and uprightness. 
There is no denying Bower's refusal to accept the 
tenets by which the House of commons Committee conducted 
it's Enquiry: rather than take advantage of the numerous 
loopholes offered to witnesses, he acknowledged his 
complicity in the Raid plot and, by so doing, took mora 
than a fair share of the blame. Due credit for this is 
ro hi""-
gi ven~by Sir James Rose-Innes in a letter of 14th July, 
29 
189?. 
My dear Bower, 
What a relief it must be to you 
to have the report concluded at last, even though the 
Committee has taken full advantage of your generous resolve 
to take upon yourself, blame which belongs to others and 
not to you. 
The real truth will only be known inside a 
small circle, but you will always have the satisfaction 
which attaches ..:to unselfish and honourable action, under 
very trying circumstances ••••••••••••. 
In September of the following year, Lord Grey 
who had been one of the "key-men" a~ the London end of the 
30 
conspiracy wrote to Bower in the same vein. 
29. Bower Letters 
30. Bower Letters 
14 - ? - 9? 
Sir J. Rose-Innes to Bower 
Sept, 1898 -
Lord Grey to Bower. 
8 
Lord Grey to Bower •••••••••••• uMy first letter, on 
coming bac~must be to congratulate you on your re~urn 
to aoti ve work and to express my very since~·~;;. hope that 
Mauritius may be the stepping stone to other Governorships. 
I think you know, without my putting it on paper, how 
greatly I have sympathised with you and Lady Bower for all 
you have been called upon to suffer. Knowing as I do all the 
circumstances, I cannot refrain from saying that I admire and 
repeot you for the way in which you have, under great trial, 
consistently behaved.~~ 
Bower's strict moral code pervades the Reminiscences. 
We find Rh~des' solicitor, Hawksley, questioning him about 
certain communications between Chamberlain and Sir Hercules 
Robinson and provoking this indignan~outburst. "I thought 
he must be mad, that no sane person could possibly ask a 
31 
public ofl'icer for official and secret information." 
He had, moreover, very decided ideas as to where his 
duty lay and, galling though the role of scape-goat might be, 
he remained firm to these principles. On Feb, 28th 1898 he 
32 ) 
wrote to J.X. Merriman trom cambridge. 
··"l'here are very few men now living who know the secret 
which it has been my duty"'.0guard, and they,· like myself, are 
bound to keep silent ••••• ~ ••••••• The question is, what was 
my duty and I have no 
31. Bower 293 
32. J.X. Merriman Letters No. 14 of 1898 
''hesitation in saying that it was to keep the peace in 
south Africa. For sixteen years, I have struggled to promote 
peace and goodwill between the two races often against long 
odds.·· 
Bower never wavered in his firm conviction that the 
only worth~hile future for South Atrioa lay in the development 
ot a )etter understanding between Dutch and English and, to 
this end, he was prepared to make considerable personal sacrifice 
This is well brought out in connection with J.H, ~ofmeyer's 
biography of "Onze Jan~ in which Bower is accused of deliberately 
delaying the High Commissioner's Proclamation denouncing 
33 
Jmneson's action. In a letter of the 28th February. 1915 
written from Balliol College, Oxford, Hofmeyer says that the 
opinions in the biography on the "delayed proclamation" are 
those of his uncle, that he is quite willing to accept~& 
Bower's assurances that the accusations are unjust - and will 
publish Bower's version of the. episode. However, Bower re.fused 
the o~iY on the grounds that Anglo-Dutch relations in south 
Atrica were already strained to the point of rebellion and to 
34 
re-open the Raid controversies would only make matters worse. 
It should also be borne in mind thatJon Bower's 
stipulation, his papers remained sealed until ~anuary 1st, 1946, 
in order that racial bitterness in 
33. J.H. Hofmeyer and F.W. Reitz- The Life of Jan Hendrik 
Hofmeyer (19l{i]- 490 - 491 
34. Bower correspondence in conn.ection with "delayed, Proclamation' 
of 31st December, 1895 - 28-2-15 - Hofmeyer to Bower 
2-3-15 -Bower to Hofmeyer 
10 -
35 
South Africa should have ample time to die: down. 
however great his determination to clear himself, in the 
interests of South Africa, he delayed the pre:.sentation of 
• 
his "apologta" for 13 years • 
.. In this, analysis c~ the extent to which the Colonial 
Office was implicated in the dameson Raid plot, use has been 
made of relevant material in the Graham Bower Papers. Bower's 
case against the Colonial Office seems a sound one, but his 
te.stimony cannot be objecti.ve, thereJ~ore it is of the utmost 
importance that he.be accepted as a man of great integrity. 
35. Ext~act from Cape Times of Saturday, May lOth 1946. 
"The only interruption of any volume to which to-dayts 
debate.gave rise was when Mr. M. Kentridge (U.P. Troyville) 
questioned the Nationalists' quality of me.roy, and a chorus 
answered him ''The Jameson Raid." 
CHAPTER 11. 
• w \ I 
::Jf'h\,_ ; ~ 0 
1 r r1. l 1 • 
I 
;, I V\. r. ·,--: \ . -
\)' 
"~r;i\. Immediately after the conviction, at Pretoria, of the 
~~qb 1 
· • leaders of the Reform Committee, the Transvaal Government, in 
t1r& second Greenbook of that year, made public the evidence 
relating to the Tameson Haid plot which had been collected 
by the State Attorney's Department - in particular, extracts 
both from Lionel Phillips private letter book and Major Robert 
White's diary, some letters rrom Jameson's captured "portefeuille" 
and, in spite of the fact that communication between Johannesburg 
Pitsani and Cape Town had been very brisk, the almost complete 
series of "inter-colonial telegrams" connected with the 
2 
conspiracy. 
All copies of these telegrams in the possession ot the 
Cape Town Office eJr the British South Africa Company had been 
3 
destroyed, early in January; but copies of a number of them 
were found in Robert White's trunk, the bulk of the remainder 
being supplied by the Transvaal Telegraph Department and, a 
few, for which the Transvaal Government specifically asked by , 
4 
the Cape Telegraph Department. 
The most enlightening of these telegrams were published 
5 
in the London Times of May 1st 1896 , causing a great stir. 
It was clear to all that Rhodes, the multi-millionaire Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony and the dominating personality on 
the Boards of three great companies - De Beers, the British 
South Africa Company, and the Goldfields of 
1. Hole 
2. s.G. Millin 
3. Br. Sel. Com. Rep -
4. Br. Sel. com. Rep -
5. Br. Sel. Com. Rep -
260 - 266 
272 
Harris 6243 - 6248 
Harris 6468 - 6469 
Beit 9456 
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South Africa Limited - had been the power behind the conspiracy, 
the organisation of which he had controlled through his brother 
Frank in cTohan.n.e sburg and cTameson at Pi tsani. Moreover, the 
Chartered Company, in which much English capital was invested, 
appeared to be deeply involved in the plot - and there was the 
immediate fear that it's charter would be revoked. 
Two telegrams, in particular, must have provoked heated 
discussion. The telegram from Fr~ Rhodes to "Charter" 
6 
Cape Town on 2lst December, 1895. 
Please. inform C .;r. Rhodes it is stated that the Chairman 
will not leave unless special letter inviting him; definite 
assurance has been given by all of us, that, on dey of flotation 
you and he will leave; there must be no departure from. this 
as many subscribers have agreed to take shares on this assurance • 
•••••••• it was agreed ••••••••• that you are responsible for 
Chairman's departure. 
And tbe telegram sent to cTameson on Boxing Dey by his 
? 
brother Sam. who was a leading member of the Reform Committee. 
It is absolutely necess~y to postpone flotation through 
unforeseen circumstanoes ••••••.••• and, until we have c.J. Rhodes' 
absolute pledge authority of ImperialGovernment will not be 
insisted. upon, 
6. Cape Com. Rep. 
?. Cape Com. Rep. 
Appendix A. No. 64 
Appendix A. No. ?2 
3 
was the "Chairman" perhaps the Hi.gh Commissioner? and why 
' -
wa~ the "Imperial Government" interfering in a conspiracy about 
.... . ., 
which, presumeably,it knew nothing? 
Both the Cape. House of Assembly and the. Brlbtish House 
' . 
of commons appointe.d Select Committees to· investigate: 
"the incursion into the: South African Republic" • 
. f"'"~'~~~b_ The· Select committee. of the House of Assembly was 
concerned with the various aspects of the Raid only "·as affecting 
-
this Colony"; and attempt to investigate the: possible complicity 
. 
of the: Colonial Office was, naturally, outside its competence. 
Messrs Rose-Innes, Merriman, Schrein.er and their 
fellow-members :found it very difficult to t\jfnduct a satisfactory 
Enquiry. Apart from th.e extreme diffioul ty wringing evidence 
/\ 8 
f'ro.m the employees of De Be·ers and the: B .s •A· company, the 
Committee was unable to examine the two most important wi tne.sses ~ 
Rhodes and Harris. Rhode,s was coping with the Matabele, and 
though notified of the Enquiry, did not submit a statement. 
Harris. who was in England gave the imminence 0~ the House of 
9 
CommonS: Enquiry, as his excuse for not returning. 
10 ' 
Act No. 4. ,f 1896 enabled the Committee to procure. 
from the Telegraph Department 0~ the. Cape of Good Hope the few 
"inter-colonial" telegrams which h.ad not yet bean 
8. Cape:. Com. Rep. 
9. Cape. Com. Rep. 
Hale. 
10. Cape. Com. Rep. 
- pviii par. 2. pviii par. s. 
272 
pviii par. 4. 
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15 
on any account to take actionn This lattar finding does seent 
to give point to W.P. Schreiner•s assertion that "Dr. Jameson 
in doing what he did, thought he was rightly interpreting the 
16 
w1 sh if not the order of his chief•; in other words that the 
responsibility for the actual Raid fiasco did n&t rest solely 
with J"am.eson. 
But Rhode.s, did not "wish" Jameson to march into the 
Transvaal exce.pt in support of a rising on the. Rand. Even Rhodes-
no~ithstanding his unorthodox ethical values - must have been 
able to appreciate the essential difference between a "dash" to 
the aid of the women and children of Johannesburg and an unprovoked 
incursion. 
I The absence of a personal order from Rhodes to J"ameson either on the 26th, the 27th or the 28th December, when he 
I 
I 
was aware that Uitlander revoluttionary enthusiasm was abating 
rap~dly 1 does not signify. For Rhodes, at that stage of his 
I carear, whether from indifferent. health or the multiplicity at 
his interests, appears to have been incapable of giving his personal 
I 17 attention to any matter of detail - however important. 
J"ameson sent two telegrams confirming his intention of 
18 
"making his own flotation with aid of letter" 
The first was handed in, at Pi tsani, at 
15. Cape. Com. Rep. 
16. Cape. Com. Rep. 
17. B. Williams - 'Rhodes· 
18. Cape. Com. Rep. 
p. xxiii par 44 
Schreiner 2544 
)..b-:; 
Appendix CC No. 06365 
6 
19 
5.p.m. on the 28th of December and sent out tor delivery in 
Cape Town, fifty - six. lbinute:s later; but, unfortunately;, the 
Chartered Company's office. was already alosed. The seaond 
20 
telegram was handed in,at Pitsani,at 9.5 a.m. on December 29th; 
both telegrams being collected by Stevens - the Assistant-Secretary-
21 
of the B.s.A. company - between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. 
Rhodes drafted the reply to J"ameson - the well-known 
telegram tram "Unbegangen." ending "on no aaeount must you move, 
22 
I must strongly objea.t to such a courseti Every ef'1'ort was 
made to send this on the Sunday (De.aember 29th), but Mat" eking 
had been"dismissed". Stevens tried again on the Monday morning, 
23 
but by then the telegraph wire has been cut. 
Rho.des, once it beaame obvious that his original plan 
had beem wreeked, did his level best with J"aneson's version of it. 
When communication was restored1at noon on Monday (December 30th), 
he made no attempt to stop J"ameson; though a dispatah rider sent 
by the Re.sident Commissioner at Mat'e.king did succeed in overtaking 
tha invading force and presenting a quite unavailing ''order to 
24 
retire" from the High c·ommissioner. on the sam day, Harris ,, ,, 
was ordered to aable the famous letter of invitation to Flora 
19. Cape. Com. Rep. Appendix CC No~ 07529 
20. Cape. Com. Rep. Appendix CC No. 00034 
21. aape. Com. Rep. p xx1 par. 36 
22. Cape. Com. Rep. Stevens 346, 2886 
23. Cape. Com. Rep. Tasker 2751 - 2762 
pxxi par 36 
24. Hole 168 - 169 
7 
25 
Shaw for insertion in the "Times"; moreover, on that Monday, 
Miss Shaw received another very interesting cable from 
' 26 "F. R. Harris focc.J. Rhodes, Premier." 
Cape Town, f 
30th Dec, 18 5. r 
Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right 
if he supports me, but he must not send cablel like he sent to 
High Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the orux is -
I will win and south Africa will belong to England. 
Did Rhodes who authorised this cable have reasonable 
grounds for expecting "support" from the Colonial Office? 
The Select Committee C)f the British House of commons 
"appointed to enquire into the origin and circumstances of the 
incursion into the South African Republic" adopted, unreservedly, 
t 27 
the Report b't the cape House of Assembly; though this Committee:,. 
after cross.-e:x:amining Rhodes and most of the leading supporters 
of the Raid plot, was able, in it' s own report, to present the 
case against Rhodes more fully. Nor was it's condemnation 
unjust:- ''Mr. Rhodes accupied a great position in south Africa 
and, beyond all other persons should have been careful to abstain 
from such a course of action as that which he adopted .•••••••••••• 
whatever justification there might have been for action on the 
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the. conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes• position •••••••••••••• 
.. 
Furthermore:, the· Committee severely censured both sir 
Graham Bower and Newton, the Resident Commissioner of 
Bechuanaland for w1 thholding from· tne High Commissioner their 
29 
fore--knowledge of Rhodes' plans • 
. , 
Bower's most important evidence at the Enquiry, had 
-
~~,b~en briefly as follows:- Rhodes had told him that he was. 
It 
•lttj$" arranging for a force on the Transvaal border in readiness for 
the ~ticipated Uitlander revolt~ he (Bower) had not informed 
Sir Hercules of Rhodes' confidence. 
(a) because he had given his word not to do so. 
(b) because he thought that before any definite action 
was taken Rhodes himself would consult the High Comndssioner. 
(c) because. he considered:. an Uitlander oY,tbreak a very 
remote~ possibility, as he had heard through his own private 
grapevine that the Transvaal government was spending money in 
;rohannesburg most eff'ectively"in dividing things'! 
In the Reminiscences,he is rather more explicit upon 
this last point "About December 7th (1895), I received news 
from Mr-. Lewis Mitchell, the manager of the Standard Bank, that 
the Transvaal Government had sent f50,000 in secret service 
money to Johannesburg; :and, a few days later, I learnt that the 
money was being spent in detaching the Labour leaders fro·m the 
31 
Capitalists and being spen.t successfullY:•" 
The chief task before the Select Committee of- the House 
of Commons was, hpwever, to answer the 
28·. Br. Sel. Com. Rep p xvi 
29. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - p xvi 
Newton was also· forced to re:sign from the Colonial Service; 
He was later re-employed. and demoted as Colonial Secretary of. 
Honduras. 
30. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Bower 2503 - 2521; 2769; 2852 - 28~ 
31. Bower 20 
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Vindication of J"oseph Chamberlain was almost as unanimous -
Newton, it is true did venture to say that Rhodes had 
"led him to believe: that the Imperial authoratie s would not 
' 59 II 
be averse. to any movement in Johannesburg; but he was the 
40 
only dissentient; for Harris and Willoughby expressed 
. themselves satisfie.d that any suspicions which they might 
have entertained regarding the possible fore-knowledge of the 
42 43 44 
Colonial Office were unfounded. Rhodes, Jameson, Flora Shaw, 
45 
and Beit were asked whether they had had any communication 
with the Colonial Office regarding the Jameson plan or whether 
from any source the Colonial Office had been give any 
e 
indication which should have forwarned it of the p+e.n - and ,.. 
the answer was in each case a firm "no" 
But not much significance can be attached to these 
denials, even though the witnesses were on oath; for a thorough 
examination both of the personnel of the Committee and of it's 
proceedings reveals a very bogus Enquiry. 
The Housa of commons Committee which was appointed on 
the 11th August, 1896 but did not commence work till February 
of the following year consisted of fifteen members. The 
Chairman was W.L. J"ackson - Member of Parliament for Leeds -
who, according to Ste~d)had "a certain 
39. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Newton - 4783 40. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. Harris - 8506 - 8512 
41. Br. Se1. Com. Rep. Willoughby - 5780 - 5808 
42. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. Rhodes - 1424 - 1426 
43. Br. Sel. com. Rep. J"ameson - 5663 
44. Br. Sel. Com. RB»:·• Flora Shaw - 9638 
45. Br. Sal. Com. Rep. Beit - 9080 - 9081 
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qu.estion:- was the. Colonial Office and/or 1 t• s ohiet 
-
re.presentative, at the. Cape. implicated in the J"ameson Raid plot 
and, it so, to what extent? For at the beginning of 1897, 
this aspect of the J"ameson Raid was till a complete mystery 
and, above. all othel3, needed a thorough investigation. 
The Committee's Report. s~ates: "Neither the secretary 
of State for the Colonies, nor any of the o.fficials of 
the Colonial Office received any information which gave them 
or should have given them fore-knowledge of the plot, during 
32 
it's de.velopmm t" and futhermore "there is no evidence, 
whatever, that the High Commissicrner had the: slightest knowledge 
of the plot or of the intended use of an armed force within 
the Transvaal. Both of which were. purposely concealed from 
33 
him. 11 
To all intents and purposes a most satisfactory answer; 
and moreover, an answer supported by the evidence of the 
witnesses who appeared before. the Committee. 
Throughout the Enquiry not so much as a breath ot 
suspicion attached itself to the name of tha Hig~Comrdssioner. 
34 35 36 37 38 
Rhodes, Bower, Beit, J"ameson. and Newton stated quite definitely 
that Sir Hercules did not know of the Raid plot, whi.le Scb,reiner, 
Phillips, Leonard and Frank Rhodes, by the very manner in 
which they tende.red their evidence, implied that Sir Hercules 
had been deliberately misled by the conspirators. The 
32. Br. Sel. Com. Rep pxvi 
33. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - pxll 
34. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Rhodes - 96 - 97, 264 - 267 
35. Br. Sal. Com. Rep Bower 2521 
36. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Beft - Ql02 - 9106 
~1 ~. Se\. ~. 0-t(J• J'~...,..~o"' . ~.)~-g - . 
~3· ~,. Se'· Co---. <Ztp f\ewt" : ll b4, 
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reputation for business capacity and average Yorkshire 
46 
shrewdness" 
Government members on the Committee were Joseph Chamberlain 
Sir Michael Ricks - Beach- tha Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Sir Richard Webster-- tha ~torney - General, Sir William 
Hart-Dyke, John L. Wharton, J .c. Bigham and George Wyndham. 
\;t"•"-5 
Bower was in England, when the Committee was"f'ormedJ 
and this is his comment- "There was competition amongst 
llhnisterialists for the. honour of' a seat amongst the. nine. one 
·M.P. assured me that Chamberlain would find him quite loyalj 
• 
if' he were chosen. I mentioned his name to Fairfielci, but 
he thought there were. others who showed greater w1 sdom in. 
47 
their loyalty." 
Representing the Qpposi tion on the Committee were 
Sir William Harcourt - leader of' the Parliamentary Qpposi tion-
who before he entered Parliament had had one of' the highest 
rep~.tations and largest incomes ever earned at the Parliamentary 
"Bar) Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman; Sydney Bu2~ton - an ex-Under 
Secretary for the Colonies, John Ellis, Edmund Blake - a former 
canadian lawyer who had become an Irish Nationalist Member of' 
Parliament, and Henry Labouohera who had for many years been a 
48 
bitter apponent of Rhodes "the Empire - cTerry-builder" and ~ 
tbe B.S.A. Company "a gambling establishment 
46• Review of' Reviews of 18th June, 1897 -Article: entitled 
"Hushed Upt or the Scandal at Westminister." 
47. Bower letters - 11 - 5 - 06 - Bower to Sir M. ON<.exmey 
(his "apologia") p. 87 
-
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49 
with the Union. cTack flying over it." Rhode.s he considered 
"a mere vulger promoter and the figtirehead Glf a gang ot 
50 
astute Hebrew financiers" - and did not hesitate to say so 
either in Parliament or in his publication "Truth•" 
. . 
What s11ikas one immediately about. this Com.rni t.tee: which 
was to determine whethe.r or not the Colonial Otfice knew 
of the. preparations to ensure a successful insurrection on the 
Rand - was that Chamberlain himselt sat on it. In normal 
circumstances, the Colonial Secretary would take an active part 
in investigating an incident which occurred. in one of tha 
Colonies; but, in this instance, Chamberlain stood. in tha 
position. of an accused party and should have refused to act 
on the Committe.e. The Colonial Secretary's right hand man, during 
the Enquiry, was George Wyndham who, in the i,utumn of the. 
previous year, 1«fttr being appointed to the Committee, had 
visited South Africa an.d stayed with Rhodes at Groote Schuur. 
Moreover,these fifteen men
1
who so unhesitatingly 
dismissed the charges against Chamberlain and the: High Commissione:lj 
did not deem. it necessary to first submit them to a thorough 
51 
cross-examination.. Lord Rosmead was said to be too ill and he 
was exculpated. without having uttered. one syllable in the 
wi tne.ss box. Nor was a statement of his read~ 
49. H. Pearson 
5Q. H. Pearson 
51. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
p. 276 
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merely two telegrams - one of February 24th 1897, stating that 
the guarantee that he would mediate upon the outbreak of an 
Uitlande-r revolt was given "without my knowledge or authoritY'! 
.53 J 
and one of the 11th March 18977, denying any fore-knowledge ot 
the: relations between the police, on the border, and the unrest 
of\ the Rand. 
Chamberlain entered the witness-box twice:, but only very 
54 
briefly-. His first appearance, on April 30th, was apparently 
for the sole purpose of weakening certain evidence of Harris 
which had just been presented~ evidence to the effect that he 
had, in Cham.berlaints presence, hinted at the real reason why 
Rhodes wanted troops on the border. Harris had no sooner made 
his statement, before the Com.11ittee:, than Chamberlain appealed 
for permission to give his version of the interview at tba 
Colonial Office. Having done eo and answered a question put 
55 
to him by Labouchere, he left the witness-stand. 
In the concluding sessions of the Enquiry, after all the 
~e evidence had been taken, Chamberlain again signified his wish 
-? 
to make a statexoont. This time with the obvious intention of • 
summing up the case for the Colonial Office and 'f trying to 
establish that Fairfield-- Assistant - Under - Secretary for 
the Colonies, at the time of the Raid- to whom Harris allegedly 
/ 
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56 
had been very deaf artd. so could not have heard the disclo.sure 
By the time the Enquiry took. place - more than a year 
atter the Raid - both Fairfield and Sir Robert Meade - the 
permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies, at the time of the 
Rl.d - had died. However, the Parliamentary Under-secretary 
Lord Selborne followed Chamberlain in the witness-box and, 
in his eagerness to support his chief, proceeded, on one pointt 
to flat~y contradict him. 
Sir William Harcourt, when cross-examining Beit had 
quoted - at some length - from a despatch of Chamberlain dated 
I 
4th February, 1896, laying stress on this paragraph:- "There 
were indeed rumours from time to time that violent measures 
were in contemplation but these rumours were continually 
falsified by the event; so that, in the long run, the opinion 
gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean to risk a 
57 
collision with the Government." But Lord Selbornes testimony 
was rather different "I was in the most constant communication 
with Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Robert Meade and Mr. Fairfield• 
throughout the autumn of 1895, and I believe l knew absolutely 
everything that passed in the Colonial Office, at that time. 
W~ believed that a bona-fide spontaneous revolution was about 
to occur in Johannesburg. It might be delayed for a yea~ or 
possibly two years, on the other hand, it might occur in a 
58 
few weeks." 
Yet notone member of the Committee commented upon this 
56. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
57. Br. Sel. Com. Hep 
58. Br. Sel. Com. R~ -
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discrepancy in viewpoint of the Colonial Secretary and his 
Under-Secre.tary. 
Not only. did Chamberlain\ by tendering evidence of such 
a fragmentary nature, in no way give the Committee a lead in 
genuinely investigating the question of Colonia1 Office complicit~ 
but he did not place at the disposal or the Committee all 
documentary evidence in the possession of the Colonial Office 
which might have had a bearing on the Raid:-
1. Any documents from the files of the late Liberal 
administration which dealt with the growing Uitlander unrest. 
e.g. Memoranda by Lord Ripoh; communications betwee;n Lord Ripon 
and Sir Henry Loch. 
2. Telegrams and despatches between the Colonial Office 
and the High Commissioner at the Cape, with the replies received, 
during the period August 1895 to February 1896. 
3. Memoranda made by Chamberlain or by officials at the 
Colonial Office, during interviews with Harris or any other of 
Rhodes' agents. 
4. All relevant letters between Chamberlain and his 
Under-secretaries- one such letter was produced at the Enquiry, 
that wJs written by Fairfield on November 4th, 1895; and it was 
ot particular interest, not only because of the most extraordinary 
interpretation,(was placed upon it by Chamberlain, (this will be 
discussed in the next chapter), but also because it gave every 
indication of being one of a series. 
5. All correspondence between the Colonial Ofi'ice end 
16 -
Rhodes' agents; in particular all the correspondence between 
Hawksley and the Colonial Of1'ioe regarding the cables which 
passed between Harris and Rhodes, during August, September, 
october and November of 1895. In June 1896, these communications 
were sent to the Colonial Office for "confidential perusal and 
·return"; but the only correspondence in connection with them~~~ 
was read before the Committee consisted of two letters at-early 
February, 1896, when the Colonial Office was first made aware 
ot their existence. The second of these letters - that from 
Hawksley to Fairfield ot February 5th 1896 ought to have 
evoked a reply, but a copy of such a reply was certainly not 
forthcoming. 
The Committee made not the slightest attempt to obtain 
all these very essential documents from the. Colonial Office; 
nor did it persevere in it•s efforts to secure the Harris -
Rhodes cables. 
A fairly detailed examination ot the evidence upon these 
cables is worthwhile. 
The first time that specific mention was made of' them was, 
on February 19th, by Sir William Harcourt, during his cross-
examination of Rhodes. 
Q. "I observe in the evidence upon the telegrams that 
Mr. Stevens says there are a great number of telegrams that 
passed at this time that were not put in at the Cape Enquiry, 
because they we.re in England with Dr. Harris. Now have you any 
objection to these telegrams being produced ••••••• A. "I consider 
that they5~ere of a confidential nature and should not ba produced. 
59. Br. Sel. com • .H.ep. Rhodes 472 - 473 
17 
on February 26th .Hhodes - in a particular unoommunioati ve 
mood - was again questioned upon the cables; on this occasion 
by Blake: 
,.. 
Q. "Have you these communications or copies of them under 
your control?" A. "I have not got them with me" 
Q.. "Do you .know where they are.?" A. "I am not aware where 
they are at present." 
Q,. "Have you_ made. an Enquiry ror them?" A. "No I have not. 
With regard to this matter, I must only say that~I consider 
they were confidential communications." .....•.•...•••....•••••• 
Q. "As to these communications re.oei ved from Dr. Harris, when 
you were. at Cape Town and you were in England, what has become 
of them?" A. "I have not got the communications from Dr. Harris 
with me •.. 
Q. "You mean you have not brought them to England?" 
A. '!No." 
q. '!So that the cable company would be the only means of 
getting them?" 
A. 'ti do not say that." 
Q.. '!Are you aware of any other means of getting the. communications 
from Dr. Harris than the Cab:J_e Company?" 
A. "That I cannot answer."60 
. ' 
Well might Labouohere, in his minority report deprecate 
the fact that "witnesses refused to make a olean breast of all 
61 
they knew." 
Nevertheless, the Colonial Secretary was just as loth · 
to cont'ide in the committee, for itras only at the twentieth 
60. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
61. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
Rhodes - 980 - 991 
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session of the Enquiry that Chamberlain, in answer to a question 
of' Labouchera; admitted that tha Colonial Office had had an 
opportunity of examining the cables in June of the previous 
62 
year. 
As soon as Chamberlain left the witness-stand, Sir 
William Harcourt proceeded to cross-question Harris, whose 
evidence the Colonial Secretary had interrupted; but he knew -
nothing. 
Q. "What became of the telegrams from England." 
A. ~They were handed by me to Mr. Rhodes. I have not them" ••••• 
Q,. '!Were these telegrams shown to anybody at the Colonial 
Office?" 
A. ''Not to my knowledge" • .....................................•. 
Q,. "Were these telegrams ever in the hands of Mr. Hawksley?" 
A. ttThat I cannot say.tt63 
The tommi ttee did, at that stage, call upon the Eastern 
Telegraph Company for copies of the cables. Well over a year 
had elap~ed since Harris' visit to England, but luckily some of 
the cables had not been destroyed)owing to a delay in completing 
the necessary book-keeping. Neyer~heless, all those sent before 
October 31st 1895 and those which, although sent after that date, 
64 
had gone via Durban had been destroyed. 
On May 18th, Harris admitted before the Committee that 
the series of cables supplied. by the Telegraph Company was 
incomplete; but he was most vague as to where the missing cables 
65 
were,- when he had last seen them, or wbo had shown tham to him. 
Hawksley - who for the past fourteen months had had a 
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keeping- was thereupon requested by the Comndttee to produce 
them. aowever, acting on instructions given by Rhodes, before: 
his departure for Rhodesia, he refused to do so. lie reminded 
the Committee that, when Rhodes was bet are it, n.o proceedings 
has been taken again.st him for the production of the cables; 
on the. con.trary, his plea that they were confidential and 
66 
therefore should not be handed over had been accepted unreservedly. 
He admi tte.d that these cables indicated Colonial Office appro valL 
of Rhodes' pl~s and that Rhodes had made use of them in 
promoting his conspiracy. A statement quite inconsistent with 
Rhodes~ evidence that he had neither directly or indirectly 
~' 67 
told"anyone" that Chamberlain knew anything about the plot." 
Furthermore, Hawksley, gave in evidence that, on Rhodes 
.eb, instructions, he had informed the. Colonial Office of the usa 
It\ It 
-une which had been made of the cables and that, some four months 
'~1~ 68 
later, the cables themselves had been sent to Chamberlain. He 
also re.ad his letter to Fairfield of February 5th, 1896 
My dear Fairfield - I thought I had better follow your 
example and so told Rhodes of my talks with you. Grey, I 
understood, has never cabled anything to South Africa and so. 
the information given to people in J"ohannesburg has all been 
oral.. I think, therefore., perhaps enough has been dona and we 
may leave matters at this point.. You know, and I do not, what 
has passed between the High Comndssioner or his secretary and 
the Colonial Office. As I hope I made clear to you, there is 
not the slightest intention to make any use whatever of confidential 
66. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
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communications. It you can hurry up the publication of the. 
despatch about the. Ultlande~it would do much good. 70 
It is surprising that Hawksley was allowed to read the 
entire letter; perhaps the committee members were so taken 
aback that they we.ra speechless. The first one to recover was 
Chamberlain and his outraged comment was ttThe witness is. 
volunteering information., he has not bee.n asked any l{Uestion as 
71 
to this.tt However, largely due to the efforts of Mr. Bigham., 
Hawksley was not asked a single: question upon this le.tter. 
A knowledge of the import of all the Harris-Rhodes cables 
was undoubtedly essential to a proper Enquiry. Yet Chamberlain 
who had actually read the cables and possibl3 made some notes 
on them. would. vouchsafe no more that that "those that were not 
pro.duced are very similar in character to those that have b~en 
?2 
produc.ed.tt More.over ,when Labouchere and Blake pressed for C\ 
~ 
further effort to obtain the cables 1their motion was defeated ?3 
by twelve votes to two. 
In it~s Report, the Committee. submitted that, if the 
cab le.s could have assi.sted Rhodes in his defence, he would have 
?4 
produced them which is tan.tamount to stating that Rhodes, 
having used the cables to convey the impression that his plans 
were approved by the Colonial Office, was now withholding them, 
70. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Page 462 
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because he knew they did not justify the representat:iet\\ which 
he had based upon the~. 
~ackson and his colleagues further excused themselves 
for not pursuing the matter on the grounds:-
A. That they ~did not consider a knowledge of the telegrams 
in any way essential to the completion of the Enquir~ which 
not only points to a very biased attitude, but also reflects 
rather badly on the efficiency of the Committee, and 
B. That Rhodes was the "person against whom proceedings 
Should properly be taken for the production of the cables" and 
the delay involved would have prevented the Committee from 
?5 
reporting to the House of commons 1bEltore, the. end of the session; 
but this does not alter the fact that all the evidence should have 
been examine.d and that proceadings could have been taken against 
Hawksley for the production of the cables. 
While the most obvious examples of the ineptitudegtthe 
Select committee are it's acquittal of Chamberlain and Sir Hercules 
Robinson without thorough cross-examination and it's failure 
to insist upon the production of possibly vital documentary 
evidence, there are many other adverse criticisms to be made of 
the manner in which the Enquiry was conducted, as, for instance, the 
most prefunctory cross-exarninati.on of Hawksley. 
Rhodes~ solicitor, apart from being a comparatively willing 
witness, was also an important one. He had custody of all the 
cablegrams between Harris and Rhodes and had conducted all the 
7 5. Br. sel. com. Rep P. XV 
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cl 
correspondence rega~~ng them with the Colonial ofrice; he had, 
moreover, been a personal friend of Fairfield and been present on 
at least one of the oceasions when Harri.s, according to his 
evidence, spoke openly to Faiz:tield of; Rhodest intentions 
. 76 
regardi.ng the force on the border. Harris stated before the 
Comndttee that, duting his stay in London, he saw Hawksley 
77 
constantly and very often consulted him before ca.ling Rhodes. 
Yet, even though he appeared three times before the Commi ttee.J 
Hawskley wa~.bar~l~ cros~-q~estioned. In particular·- no 
"""'""~c. ;o crl)~~ ~\1\.u'f't() ... " ... e1~ ~u)\ "! s rt~ ~ 
attempt was~Fairfield of February 5th, or upon the interview 
between Harris and Fairfield. He was asked what had occasioned -
his despatch to the Colonial. Office of the Harris-Rhodes cables, 
at least four months after his original intimation. to Fairfield 
at their existence; but Bigham would not allow this question 
to be answered and, immediately afterwards, the Chairman ordered 
78 
the room to be cleared. 
In his Draft Report, Labouchere. comments that "witnesses 
79 . 
from the War Office were not examined." In fact, he was only 
../" 
at the .. instigation of Labouchere that Sir Johil Willoughby's 
letter to the War Office which should have been amongst the 
documents laid on the Table,at the commencement of the Enquiry, 
was eventually produced~This letter .- a vain attempt to save the 
commissions of Willoughby's officers - affirmed the "honest and 
bona fide belief" at the 'h.me of the Raid "that the steps were 
76. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Harris 8584 
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80 I 
taken with the knowledge and assent of the Imperial Authorities. 1 
But neither the Adjutant-General nor the Secretary of state for 
War were questioned as to why they had nat accepted this plea. 
Willoughby, when examined upon this letter, by Sir William 
Harcourt, simply refused to answer, giving, as the reason for 
his virtual defiance of the Committee, that he could not 
~ 81 
abuse Jamesons confidence. However, JJ.ameson himself was recalled 
and questioned. He smoothed matters over by stating that the 
assurances given by Willoughby and himself to the officers must 
have been based partly on their knowledge that, once the re vchlt 
broke out, the High Commissioner would be called upon to 
arbitrate. and partly upon their complete eadrd.t\Ctthat the 
82 
inroad would be successful. He admitted that the use in the 
letter, Gf the words "Imperial Authorities" was unfortunate, but 
83 
the actual drafting of the letter had been done by Hawksley. 
Furthermore Jameson declared most emphatica11t, that never had 
he told his officers or anyone· else that he had the support of 
the Imperial Government "it would have been quite idiotic if 
84 
I had done so and absolutely untrue." 
But not one of the officers was swnmoned to give the 
Committee his version of the grounds upon which his commission 
-- 85 
had been guaranteed by Jameson and Willoughby. Nor was any 
attemptA_to find out from officials at the War Office whether 
Hawksley, when submitting Willoughby's letter to themlhad used 
so. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Page 306 
81. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Willoughby -5634 - 5639 
82. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Jameson - 5661 
83. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Jameson - 566.0 
84. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Jameson - 5663 
85. Review--ReviewS,- August 1897 - "The 'fl.hi te-we.shing of 
Mr. Chamberlain. 
24 -
tbe cablegrams in his custody to back up the statements of his 
client~. 
A very valuable witness would have been Lord Grey, a 
Director of the Chartered Company, at the time of the Raid, who 
had,. since,. replaced Jameson as administrator of Matabeleland. 
86 
Harris admitted having discussed the Jameson plan with Grey, 
furthermore, certain telegrams indicate~lthat he was assisting 
Harris in negotiating for the~ansfer of the Protectorate:-
8? 
A telegram from Harris to Rhodes of 2nd November, 1895. 
Confidential, Earl..r Grey held an interview with 
J. Chamberlain; I have seen native chiefs ••••••••••••••••• 
J. Chamberlain .. will put pressure on them to ·settle •••••••• 
And another from Harris to Rhodes of 4th November, 1895. 
Registered address of Earl Grey is Gothical London. 
You must register this on your side at once. 
Moreover, Grey,the friend and associate of Harris, was also 
a friend of Chamberlain and had been present at the interview 
with the Colonial Secretary, whea Harris made his "guarded 
89 
allusionw to Rhodes' plans. Yet Grey was allowed to remain, 
90 
undisturbed,in Bulawayo. 
Flora Shaw - the Colonial Correspondent on the "London 
91 
Times" who knew all about the dameson plan and whom Harris had 
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supplied with the private telegraphic code ~ the Chartered 
92 
company was summoned before the committee almost as an after-
93 
thought and then only as a result of agitation by Labouchere. 
This near omission is particularly interesting in view ot 
the fact that Miss Shaw was not only able to communicate in 
code with Rhodes, but was also persona grata at the Colonial 
Offiee - to the extent of calling there two or three times a 
94 
week to discuss Colonial affairs. The at-ci tude of Committee 
members towards the witness was the acme of chivalry - evan 
Labouchere, though possibly he was merely stunned by her 
eloquence, because in his report he remarks acidly "The relations 
of Miss Shaw with certain directors of the Chartered Company with 
Office 95· 
Mr. Harris and with the Colonialjwer·e peculiar." 
Miss Shaw was questioned as to the number of cables which 
had passed between Rhodes and herself, She rembered that she had 
96 
sent Rhodes three cables, but could only remember receiving 
one from h~m "a purely formal cable with nothing in it." 
The Committee did, however, at that late. stage, call 
upon the Eastern Telegraph Company f'or these- cables; and, at 
it's last session before drafting the Report, examined Miss Shaw 
upon them - but there were two cables from Rhodes end neither 
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~ "purely formal." The good lady, in her eagerness to 
atone. for her lapse ~f memory, then conf'idexrt that, acc:ording 
to her household accounts, there was yet another cable one 
which she had sent to Rhodes on January lst, 1896, but which 
98 
the Cable Company had been unable to produce. 
Not only were important cables which should have been 
laid on the table, at the commencement of the Enquiry; only 
called for half-way through, and at the end, but witnesses who 
should have been examined on this evidence were allowed to leave 
England. Rhodes returned to Rhodesia on April 3rd, 189? and 
the Committee was unable to question him either on the Rhodes-
Harris cables or on the .Hhodes-Shaw cables. Harris was also· 
permitted to disappear. He went abroad and "his address could 
not be obtained" when, at the last moment, his testimony was 
needed in connect!' on with a cable sent tn Rhodes' name, but which 
it's recipient Flora Shaw declared to be a product of the 
99 
fertile imagination of' Harris. 
The foregoing criticisms have been specific to particular 
aspects of the Enquiry; those which follow pertain to the 
Enquiry as a whole. 
The predominant impression gained, om examining the way in 
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which Committee members conducted their cross-examinations, 
on considering the nature of their questions is that they 
were not genuinely investigating the possibility of Colonial 
Office complicity in the Raid plot. 
The examination of Rhodes oocupied five and hal~ sessions 
and he was asked some 2121 questions upon every conceivable 
sidelight of the Uitlander movement and of the Rai~itself; upon 
his own political philosophy and upon the subtleties of Cape 
and Transvaal politics; but only Labouchere tried to question 
him upon the actual subject matter of the cables from Harris 
1V ""'f,I...J lt~ ~ 
and Miss Shaw and, when he objected on the goounds that his 
A 
answers would invova "third parties" whom the Comndttee ought 
100 
to examine in person, not even Sir William Harcourt protested. 
When cross-examining Bower, both Harcourt. and Labouchere 
harked back,time and again
1
to the import of his conversation 
with Rhodes, on that morming in octooer; yet not once did either 
of them ask whether Rhodest confidences had included an assuranee 
that the Colonial. Office knew and approved of his plans. 
W .P •. Schreiner who had not the remotest connection w1 th 
the.Raid was asked 1283 questions on the state of the South 
Atrican Colonies; while Beit whose. complicity in the Raid plot had 
been established by the Transvaal Greenboo.k No. 2 was asked 3?8 
questions and Ma!uire, the close friend of Rhodes who sat on the 
1oo. Br. sel. com. Rer Rhodes 136? - 1418 
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Board of the Chartered Company as his proxy, was asked 240 
questions. On. the testimony of Harris, both Beit and Maquire 
had been in ~t:s conf.idence, during the weeks he was negotiating 
. 101 
tor the jumping-off ground. He could not recall their presence 
at any of his interviews with Fairfield b~t admitted that it 
was nwithin the knowledge of these gentlemen that I spoke 
102 
openly to Mr. Fairfield." Moreover, the telegrams to Rhodes 
had been seen by ei. ther Bei t or Maguire- or both of them -
before being sent off. Yet their examinationS compared with 
that of Schreiner wtftcursory in the. extreme. . The Comnd ttee 
was most interested in the exact instructions Beit haa given 
104 
Phillips regarding the financing of the Uitlander re.vol~, but 
not in the least conce:tl'ied whether his communications to 
Phillips had conveyed the impression that the sbhemes of the 
conspirators had Colonial Office approval. 
·witnesses were questioned at length on the iniquities 
of Kruger's Government) the real and fancied grievances of the 
Uitlande~s) the most intimate details of Rand mining economy 
(the last top.ic being o)~pec~al interest to Labouohere.) while, 
in contrast ~he possibleAknowledge of the Colo~ial Office 
r.ecetve·<dl. very scanty attention. As the mother of J" .x. Merriman· 
commented indignantly "The committee might have been instituted 
105 
solely for the investigation of Transvaal affairs." 
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What is so significant is that both Government and Opposition 
members of the House of Commons Committee were equally responsible 
for the fact the. 1 t was in the words of Sir Edward Cooke 
of the Daily News a veritable "Committee of No-Enquiry.~ 
Not that ·Labouchere, Sir William Harcourt or Blake di.d not, on 
occasion, venture a pertinent question• what they did n0tdo 
was protest 
1
when the witness was prevented from answeringJ either 
by the interruption of another committee member,or by the cry that 
the. room must be cleared; or, for that matter, when a reluctant 
witness claimed that a question was one of confidence. and should 
not be pressed or refuse.d to make a disclosure because a "third 
partY" was involved. 
It w~s not considered intthe least irregular when 
Chamberlain, in the course of his cross-examination of Bower, 
asked:~ •••••••.•••••••••••• '' is Mr. Rhodes willing that you. 
100 
should state what happened which he stated to you in confidence.~ 
Why did not that astute barrister Sir William Harcourt oppose 
this extraordinary ruling upon the giving of evidence? 
Labouchere might offer the excuse that witnesses "refused 
'to make a clean breast of all they kneWff but the onus was on 
the Committee to press for frank disclosures and this it failed 
100. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Bower: 2514 
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signally to do. All the "it may have beens~)and the "it may 
nat have beens"t the amazing lapses of memOry~ which were·. 
accepted with the utmost composure. 
With the appearance of Hawksley in the witness-box, the 
Committee abandoned almos.t all pre.tence of being concientious 
or impartial. Even Labouchere, though he did procure the 
appearance of Mlss Shaw, in the witness box, accepted the 
inevitable. This does npt. lose sight of the fact that, but for 
Labouchera, the Enquiry might have been a complete farce, 
neverthele.ss the vigour with which,. in the early stages of the 
Enquiry, he set about finding out the truth, was, in it's latter 
sessions, largely devoted to impugning the alleged. "stock-j olsb'ing" 
motives of Harris and Beit. 
It is also perfectly true that neither Labouchera nor 
Blake supported Sir William Harcourt's Draft report which the 
Committee finally adopted,on 13th July, 1897. Blake withdrew 
from the Committee in protest against the non-production of tha 
"Hawksley" cables, and Labouchere, of course, submitted a 
separate report. This receiged one vote - his own. The final 
paragraph of this report expresses, with a delicacy one would 
not have thought Labouchere: possessed, "regret'' that the 
Committee failed to conduct a proper Enquiry. 
"•••••••••••••the committee regrets that the alleged complicity 
of the Colo~ial Office has not been probed to the bottom, because 
the slightest appearance of any indisposition to do this by your 
committetmay lead some persons erroneously to suppose that there 
- 31 -
may be some truth in the statements of witnesses connected 
with the Jameson plan that the secret· aims of Mr. Rhodes were 
more or less clearly revealed to Mr. Chamberlain and to 
tl 
Mr. Fairfield •............. ................................. •. 
' What Labouchere de.scribes as "erroneous supposi ttonsn 
. 
were certainly well to the fore in the contemporary press, 
as these extracts indicate~--
Westminister Gazette of June 11th 1897: 
Fortified by unctuous rectitude and an unsuspicious 
disposition the Committee was unsparing b~ white-wash. 
Review of Reviews (London) of August, 1897. 
So far as the world outside England is concerned 
the attempt to palm off, as the verdict of an. impartial tribuna1~ 
this foregone conclusion of a packed committee has already been 
a conspicuous failure. 
Le Temps. 
The course pursued by the Committ.ee is in itself 
an avowal. 
Moscow Gazette. 
This scandalous and disgraceful shame of an 
investigation by the South Afril!.an committee. 
Revieweof ReviewS(New York.) 
. Mr. Rhodes position is enviable in comparison with 
that of the British Colonial Office, the hypocritical conduct/which 
is rendered all the more conspicuous by the white-washing of ~he 
Committee.l07 
And without doubt, the Select Committee's v.lndication 
of the Colonial Office ~ quite unjustifiable; for, not mere:ly 
was the personnel of the Committee unsatisfactory, in view of the 
nature of the En-quiry; but it by no mreans examined all the 
. 
evidence which mightlhave a bearing ~pon the question of Colonie! 1 
Office complicity and made no attempt to deal adequately or 
convincingly with such evidence as was produced. 
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the Selec.t Committee oi the House of: Commons 
dianot honestly investigate the axtant of Colonial Office. com-
plicity in the, J"ameson Raid points to there being a genuine nec-
essity to "whitewash" Chamberlain and Sir H.ercules Robinson - and, 
according to Sir Grah.am.. Bowe.r, there ~ such a necessity tor both 
les the. Colonial Secretary and his Chief repre.sentative at the Cape 
ware. tully aware of what Rhodes was up to. 
Bower does not draw any clear distinction between the two 
aspects ot the. plot; viz the. stationing ot the force at Pi tsani -
and the. instigation of a revolt on the Rand. He assumes that those 
who possessed foreknowledge of Rhodes• plans knew, not only ot his 
intention that the torca, on the Transvaal border, should ensure 
a success:f'Ul Uitlander revolt, but el.so o'f his close association 
wi..th the. Reform Committee which was organising that revolt. 
By the end of October 1895, the Jameson Raid conspiracy was 
wall under way. At the end of May, Beit had come out from England 
1 
and Rhodes had discussed with him ways and means - whereupon Beit 
departed for the Rand and communed with Phillips. Leonard and the 
2 
other members of the Reform Committee • Jameson, meanwhile, was 
3 
organising a Volunteer Corps in Rhodesia. on the return of Beit 
to the Cape, Rhodes and he brooded upon their schema and, on July 
4. 
14th, he returned to England. 
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On July 27th less than a month after the Unionist 
Government had been installed - Harris arrived in London 
to secure fro~.Chamberlain the fulfilLment of Lord Ripon's 
promise to transfer the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the rule 
of the B .s .A. Company. This would not only enable the railway 
to be extended Northwards from Mafeking, but would give Rhodes 
- a base on the Transvaal border; moreover, the withdrawal of 
Imperial control from Bechuanaland would mean the disbanding 
'( 
of the Bechuana.land Border Police who would be welcome recui.ts 
5 'A 
to Jameson's force. 
About the 16th or 17th of October - Rhodes, Phillips, 
Hammond, Frank Rhodes (who, on the great day at tha. rising, was 
to be Office commanding the Uitlanders) and Leonard met at Groote 
Schuur. It was agreed that, at some convenient data, the Uitlanders 
would revolt, ~~ze the Pretoria arsenal and the ammunition~ 
• from there; then retire upon Johannesburg and hold the town. 
J~eson would be on the border with a force and, upon the 
outbreak of the revolt)would, march in to assist the Uitlanders 
against the Boers; while the High Commissioner, as soon as the 
worst of the shooting was over, would depart for Pretoria to 
6 
act as mediator. 
-------~--
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the details of the conspiracy-, but its most important features. 
One morning - fairly late in October - he came into Bowerts 
office and told him that, he was arranging for a force on the 
Transvaal border in readiness tor the anticipated Uitlander revolt. 
7 
lie assured Bower that Chamberlain knew of his plans. 
Bower realised to just what extent Rhodes - the Prime Minister 
of the c·ape Colony - was compromising his position; his "connection 
with the Uitlander rising was so obvious". But "with Chamberlain 
at his. baek I could not oppose him ••••••• I felt,. however, that 
8 
Rhodes must tell the High Commissioner, confidentially." 
. 
Rhodes did not require much persuasion, the High Commissioner, 
in the ~le of mediator, was such an integral part of the plot that 
it was hardl.y practical not to confide in him: in fact, Frank Rhodes 
had refused to leave for J"ohannesburg, until Sir Hercules had been 
9 
told. 
Bower "conducted Rhodes to the High Commissioner's office and 
10 
lett the two men al.one together." 
The High Commissioner did not, however, discusa this conversat-
ion with his Imperial Secretary- and, on the following day, when 
Bower began to discuss generally the trouble on the Rand, he was cut 
? Bower 
8 Bower 
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short with the remark "The less you and I have to do with these 
11 
damned conspiracieS- ot Rhodes and Chamberlain the better." 
" 
Aoc·ording to Rhodes h~·s ·attitude on the previous day, had 
been the same. "After I had told him everything, the only quest-
ions he put to me were "Is Beit in it?" and "llave you told Bower?" 
' - - . 
He then said "I dont want to hear anything more about it."" 
Dec. 1\t~ In a letter written from Mauritius to Sir Montague 0 ~nney -
,, oS"'" 
!) Permanent Under-Secretary for the. Colonies - Bower says that Lionel 
Phillips,. Jameson and Beit discussed their plans with the High 
13 ' 
Commissione.r. All three certainly had ample opportunity for doing 
so. Phillips was in Cape Town, during the latter part of october, 
14 . 
and, at least during part of November: J"ame.son spent most or 
15 
November in Cape Town, while Beit arrived from England 1on December 
16 
17th and was staying at Groote Schuur, when the Raid took place. 
' In the Reminiscences, Bower confirms that Sir Hercules saw 
Phillips and J"ameson, in Nov~ber. 
"Sir Hercules told me 'Phillips says they are getting plenty 
of arms, but he had better not tell me how they are coming in.' 
Jameson years afterward told me that1 in his interview with 
Sir Hercules)he took care to satis.f'y himself' that the High Commiss-
. 17 
ioner knew everything." 
Bower dtinot, however, at any time prior to the Raid, discuss 
ll Bower 
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the ~onspiracy with the High Commissioner; for he knew that Rhodes 
himself had told Sir Hercules everything and that, while the High 
Commissioner's aonscience. would permit him to accept information 
fromBhodes as 'privata and confidential', information from Bower 
18 
would have to be regarded as 'official' 
But what concerns us is that, from the start, Bower did not 
feel unduly <Wnr\',:txe~ ~bout Rhodes' confidence, because Rhodes had 
also confided in his chief - the High Commissioner - and, moreover, 
that both Sir Hercules and Bower had been assured by Rhodes that 
Chamberlain knew and approved of his plans. 
In order to find out upon what grounds Rhodes based this 
assertion, it is necessary to examine, in some detail, the su~cess­
ive stages of Harris' negotiations for the incorporation of Bech-
uanaland Protectora~a within Charterland. 
--------· -· .. 
Chamberlain's biographer - J.L. Garvin notes that Harris took 
part in discussions in the Colonial Secretary's office, on four 
different occasions - August 1st, August 20th, September 5th and 
19 
November 6th. 
On August lst, Harris was introduced to Chamberlain by Earl 
Grey; Lord selborne, Sir Robert Meade and Mr. Fairfield were also 
20 
present. 
Harris, in his evidence before the Select Committee, stated 
"At that interview, I entered necessarily at great length ........ 
into all the questions of the late Governments promise, of Khama•s 
opposition, the necessity for the railway •••••.• and other matters· 
18 Bower 





pertinent to the transfer; Mr Chamberlain expressed a keen 
interest in the policy of railway extension, but regretted 
his inability to consider the question of an inuaediate transfer 
of the Protectorate. In addition to these complex and intricate 
questions, it was present to my mind that, in the. event of a 
rising at Johannesburg, Mr Rhodes wished to be in a position 
to render assistance with the police forces of' the B.S.A. 
Company shoumd certain eventualities arise. I made no explicit 
statement to that ef1'ect, but I rererred to the unrest at 
Johannesburg and added a guarded allusion to the desitability 
or there being a police force near the border. Mr Chamberlain 
21 
at once demurred to the turn the conversion had taken." 
Nevertheless, before Chamberlain "demurred" the "guarded 
allusion" had been made • 
. 
Immediately after Harris' statement Chamberlain testified 
that "if such an allusion was made, I did not understand it, 
at all events as referring to anything which has subsequently 
22 
taken place"; in other words he did not "understand" it was 
, 
"referring" to Jamesons raid. But Harris' attempted disclosure. 
had absolutely no bearing upon an unprovoked incursion into 
the Transvaal ••••••••••••• what he was trying to do was to give 
the Colonial Secretary some inkling of Rhodes' plans to secure 
a successful Uitlander revolt; csf which plans Chamberlain's friend 
Lord Grey was already aware. 
,~t'h ft\"~,18Cf1 on his third appearance, in the witness box, in reply 
to a question or Blake, Harris defined his "guarded allusion" as 
21. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 






a statement to the effect that "we S:l.all be on the border; and 
and if a rising takes place, in Johannesburg, of course we 
• 
should not stand by and see them t·f.,ghtly pressed." but 
he accepted that hi.s words ei the.r had not been heard by the 
. 23 
Colonial Secretary or else had conveyed absolutely nothing. 
Nevertheless these words of Harris were far too explicit 
l~\- for the Colonial Secretary's taste and, on the second of his 
~a~ two brief appearances in the witness box, he declared "I am 
'11,1 
convinced that Dr Harris is mistaken in supposing that he 
used the words which he suggested or gave to Mr Blake in that 
answer. And I would point out to the Committee that that 
would not have been a guarded allusion at all •••••••••••••••• 
In any case, ~certainly never had any allusion of a definite kind 
1 24 
which could have aroused my suspicio~." 
But, whatever the evidence given upon this interview almost 
u~~ two years after it occurred, on the day following the interview, 
?Av.c. 25 
~~~1 Harris stated in a cable to Hhodes:-
• ••••••••• we, decided therefore to inform Secretary of 
State for colonies guardedly reason why we. wished to have base 
at Gaberones and advisable our presence in Protectorate. 
Secretary of State for Colonies heartily in sympathy with c.~. 
Rhodes' policy. 
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This is one of the cables which the Committe of Enquiry 
did not insist upon examining. According to tarvin who seems 
26 
to have had access to all the Chamberlain Papers, there were 
seven of these "missing cables"; he quotes not the cables 
themselves whico/'unfortunate but excerpts ft'om them and 
notes made of them, while the dossier was at tha ColoniaL 
27 
Office. The existence~ this data, is particularly 
interesting in view of Chamberlain's complete inability, at the 




On August 13th 1895 Harris sent off to Rhodes the second 
of the "missing" cables:-
Chamberlain will do anything to assist except hand over 
to the administration Protectorate provided he officially does 
not know of your plan. He does consider Rhodes' ingenuity 
resource can overcome any difficulty caused by refusal 
Protectora-re now. 
' Chamberlains diffidence regarding the transfer of the 
Protectorates is understandable in view of the prominence given 
in the Press to the three chiefs Khama, Sebele, Bathoen -
who, under the guidance of two missionaries, were on their way 
to England to protest against the encroachment of the Chartered 
30 
Company on Bechuana territory. 
There. is no available account of Harris' visits to the 
26. a: arvin Life of cToseph Chamberlain (1934) Vol. 1. 
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Colonial Office· on August 20th and on September 5th. However~ 
a cable to Rhodas oi" August 21st {"missing" cable. number three) 
31 
contained this sentence:-
You are aware. Chamberlain state.s Dr. J"a.m.e.son's plan must 
not be. mentioned to him. 
while, on September 6th, he considered himself' justitied in going 
32 
up to Scotland f'or a month. 
~~t~ Five days later, Chamberlain had change.d his mind as to the 
I£·\ rl ~q S' 1 
tate of' the Protectorate., because he suggested to Chief's Khama, 
Sebele andBathoen that they come to terms with the Board or the 
B.S.A. Company to whom. the Protectorate - apart from the 
33 
necessary native reserves would be handled over. 
The Colonial Secretary spent the following seven weeks~ 
an the Continent, from where·, he granted to the Chartered Company 
administrative rights over a small strip of' territory - North 
of' Maf'eking and sui table as jumping -off ground - which had 
been ceded to Rhodes by the Chiefs I:k:_aning and Lv1ontsioa - two 
Bechuana chiet/s who had not accompanied the dep<U'tation to 
34 
England. 
on October 19th, 1895, orders were issued to detachments 
of' the. Rhodesian Police to move down from Bulawayo to Pitsani. 
35 
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10 
aaoctober 18th that Rhodes made his disclosures to Bower. 
For, on the following day, after Sir Hercules had refused to 
discuss with Bower "these damned conspiracies of Rhodes and 
Chamberlain" he authorised him to allow "the troops to move 
36 
dawn from Bulawayo." To futher corro~ate this date there. 
is the fact the Frank Rhodes - who had made his departure 
tofthe Rand contingent upon the High Comndssioner being 
informed of th. plot 
37 
20th 1895. 
left for Johannesburg on. october 
The crisis caused by President Krugerts proclamation 
closing tha vaal River drifts!.. against overseas goods, imported 
b~"'~>'-'~ht- Chc.lo'\~t-\"i"' hl}.f('Qt"'~ "'"(..\<:. F'' ........ ~"''" 
through the Cape Colony.~at the end of october. 
ov 
5 
Then followed a spate of telegrams from. Harri.s to Rhodes 




Confidential. Earl~ Grey held an interview with J. 
Chamberlain. We have seen Native chiefs; decline our proposal 
but we hope they will make counter proposal. J. Chamberlain 
will put pressure upon them to settle. 
39 
Two days later he sent this bulletin:-
;r. Chamberlain he does not return to London until tomorrow. 
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I have spoken openlsr ·co E. Fairfield and I have accepted, if 
Colonial Of:Lice will transfer to us balance: Prote.ctorata with 
Police 7th November we will agree: to any liberal police reserves 
to native chiefs ••••••••••••••••• 
As regards the date mentioned by Harris-November 7th - Rhodes 
appe.ars to have stressed that November 7th was to be tha latest 
40 
date for the acquisition of the Police. 
When Labouchere has trying to elicit from a very reluctant 
Harris some details of his "open" .. conversation with Fairfield, 
Chamberlain signified that he wishedlto read a letter from 
Fairfield, written to him, at Birmingham, immediately after the 
41 
conversation had taken place. 
Fairfield to Chamberlain - November 4th - You will 
see. that events are moving rapidly in South .Africa - Rhode.s, 
having accepted the responsibilities imposed on him, is naturally 
very keen to get the Protectorate question settled and had been 
telegraphing all day to this end ••••••••••••••••••• Rhodes 
wants you then to authorise the Bechuanaland Border Police to 
enlist with the Company •••••••••• Rhodes •••••••••••• wants to 
get our people off the scene, as this ugly row is pending with 
the Transvaal. That I think is also our interest ••••••• ! do, 
not think there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will 
40. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
41. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
Harris 8520 ff 




give way on the immediate question of the drifts, but that will 
not end the political "unrest." 
Chamberlain, when reading this l.etter, at the Enquiry, 
interpre.ted the "ugly rowtt as the dispute with Kruger over the 
closing of the drifts; but Fairfield apparently considers that 
the Transvaal will give way on the drifts question, so the words 
"ugly rowtt and "unrest" must refer to some other contingency. 
Moreover, why should Imperial :Droops be hurried off the scene, 
unless events connected with the ugly row are likely to 
compromise Her Majestyts Government. The drift crisis could 
result only in an of1·icial war; in which case the removal of 
Imperial Troops would be to the reverse of "our interest.tt 
Harris, moreover, when questioned upon this letter proved 
rath.er wvo-operative. He had spoken "more openly" to 
' 
Fairfield than the lette.r implied, in fact he had "mentione.d" 
to him that "one of the reasons why Mr Rhodes was anxious to 
get the Protectorate was that he considered it imperative to 
have a British force, on the borders, so that, in the event of 
disturbances taking place at Johannesburg, he could be in a 
position, if he deemed it right, to use that force in connection 
42 
with it." 
It is perfectly true, as Labouchere•s draft report points 
out, that, in his letter, Fairfield does not state ~hat Harris 
1/ 
made such a communication to .. .him; but what are the "responsibilities 
accepted by Rhodes? R.I. Lovell in his book "The Struggle. for 
42. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Harris 8586 
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South Afri.catt - considers that the: "responsibili tas"' are these.. 
43 
accepted. by Rhodes in connection with. the drifts ultimatum. But,. 
then again. what ha'lle such responsibilities to do wi.th getting the 
Protectorate, question settled? It seems more logical that the 
r.espon.sibili.t.ies are. connecte.d with the "ugly rowtt - with the 
"'politiaal unre .. st" which is moving rapidly to a climax; but we 
still ha'lla no indication a.s to the. nature: of the re:sponsibili ties, 
except that they in"Eolve. a.n immediate. se.ttlemen t of' the: Protectorate 
question.. Of' c.ourse;,. if this letter had been. any more explicit. 
C:ham.b e.r lain i.s hardly like.ly to have.· produced it , at the Enquiry. 
Thera is another inte.restin.g communication dated November 4th -
44 
the cable from. H:arris to Rhodes ending:-
•... • . I have already sent Flora to conv.inc.e ;r. C:hamberlain su:pp ort 
Times newspaper and, if you can telegraph course: you wish Times to 
adopt now with re:gar.d to Transvaal,. Flora will act. 
At the .Enquiry,. Labouche:r.e: suggested to Harris that he ren.der 
this cable slightly more intelligible.: Harris:- "Provided the; 
settle-ment. wa.s a fair one: in Miss Shaw's opini.on she would support 
the policy of' th.e Protectorate being hand.ed over to the Chartered 
- 45 
Company-." 
This is his explanation of the first. part. of. the. sentence; 
43. R.I. L.ove.11 
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as regards the second part, he had previously stated in 
reply to a question of Harcourt. that it referred to the drifts 
question:- "It was known that the Transvaal was acting in a way 
very hostile to British interests. Miss Shaw wished for 
accurate information in order that she might support Britisn 
46 
and Colonial interests." 
' 
Neither of these explanations of Harris is very convincing, 
Chamberlain had decided, before going abroad to hand over the 
Protectorate to the Chartered Company; it only remained to hurry 
up the actual transfer. So Flora Shaw was convincing the Colonial 
Secretary (of) support (of) Times newspaper tli" a rather late stage 
of the Protectorate negotiations. 
It was also a little late to be aSking for information 
on the drifts question; for the previous day (November 3rd), 
Sir Hercules Robinson had telegraphed to Pretoria Chamberlain's 
ultimatum "that the recent action of the South African Republic is 
a breach of Article Xlll of the London Convention"; and Kruger 
47 
was about to re-open the drifts. 
However, tij.is is the first indication of the possible· 
rOle of Flora Shaw that of intermediary between the Colonial 
Office and the conspirators. Although, when questioned upon 
this cable, she implied to the committee that it would have 
been entirely beneath her dignity to assist Harris in his dealings 
4B 
with the Colonial Office. 
Miss Shaw was, of course, fully aware of the "Jameson plan", 
. 46. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
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at the beginning of November 1895. At this point, it is of 
interest to note that she told the Committee that all she 
understood by the "Jameson plan" was that Dr Jameson would 
-
have a force ready which could be called upon by the High 
Commissioner, in case he had to interfere in the quarrel 
50 
between the Uitlanders and the Boers; but that Aarvin quotes 
a conversation with Miss Shaw in which she gives the following 
version of Harris' confidence:- "The trouble in Johannesburg 
must break out; we must be ready to go in to the help of the 
J/ 
Uitlanders, if need be. 
a~ih 53 
Miss Shaw is mentioned~in a cable •G November 5th:-
Harris to Rhodes - We have seen E. Fairfield, Han. R.H. 
Meade, Colonel Gould Adams53 and we have agreed to what land 
we give native schiefs. Secretary of State for Colonies holds 
an interview with us tomorrow •••••••.•••••• native chiefs they 
will be present and, if they are satisfied, Secretary of State 
for colhies he will grant B.S.A. Company balance Protectorate 
with police. We reported your letter to A. Beit during August 
to these and Flora. We have these solved. 
Harris stated before the Committee, that the letter from 
Rhodes to Be it during August dealt solely with Rhodes' views:' 
regarding the Protectorate; Fairfield, Gould-Adams and Flora 
Shaw were told the gist of the letter, and he was underJimpression 
49. Br. Sel. Com .. Rep Harris: 8581-8583 
50. Br. Sel. Com. Rep Shaw: 88?5- 88?6 
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that Sir Robert Meade had also been informed, but this was 
54 
not the case. 
Though why, on the day before the Protectorate was due, 
to be handed over it should be necessary for "we" i.e. Harris, 
55 
Beit, Ma3u1re and possibly Hawksley to assure Rhodes of the 
"solid" support of Flora Shaw, Gould-Adams and Fairfield in 
' 
connection with the transfer of the Protectorate, it is 
difficult to understand. Moreover, as Labouchere was careful 
to point out at least one of the three, viz Miss ShaW 1presumeabl~ 
56 
knew all about Rhodes' plot. 
On November 6th, Harris was present at the Colonial Office, 
when the final settlement was made between the Bechuana ~~s 
and the Chartered Company, all territory to the East of the 
57 
proposed railway line being handed over to the Company. The 
following, day, Sir Hercules Robinson was informed of the t,ransf-er 
and authorised to allow the Bechuanaland Border Police to enrol 
58 
in the service of the B.S.A. Company. 
But the Colonial-secretary had struck a fairly hard bargain, 
for the chartered company forfeited ~£200,000 promised by the 
Liberal Governmant as a subsidy for the railway, and Harris had· 
to concede very large tracts of land as native reserves. 
Rhodes was not pleased with the boundary lines drawn by 
Chamberlain:-
54. Br. Se1. com. Repv Harris: 8221 
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November 12th Rhodes to Harris 
be utterly beaten by these niggers. 
It is humiliating to 
November 15th Rhodes to Harris settlement is a 
scandal.59 
rch ·~~~~1 In his ~xamination of Rhodes before the Committee of 
.. 
Enquiry, Chamberlain led him over all the details of finance 
connected with the session of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
to justify, on the score of the excellent bargain he had made, 
his entrusting a commercial Company with the responsibilities 
of maintaining the frontier against an independent State 
a state, moreover, with whom Great Britain had a few days 
60 
previously,. been on the verge of war. 
Rhodes admit~ed that the Colonial Office had saved the 
cost of the Border Police amounting to nearly £60,000 per 
year:-
Chamberlain thereupon ask.ed "We also saved did we not ••••••••• 
' 
a sum of £200,.000 which ~ had been promised you by my 
predecessor as a subsidy to the railway?" 
Rhodes: "Yes, you made a most excellent bargain." 
Chamberlain: "And perhaps you. were the more ready to make a 
good bargain because you had some other views?" 
6J. 
Rhodes: "I am afraid you took advantage\ of them." 
W.T. Stead considers this Rhodes~ one lapse, during 
his five and half days before the. Committee; for how could 
59. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
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Chamberlain have taken advantage of those"other v.iewsnof Rhodes, 
62' 
if he had been unaware of theiJl .. ,, 
Bower re.cords the arrival, lat.e in October, or early in 
November of- the first communication between Clamber lain anJsir 
Hercules concerning a possible revolt on the Rand:- "a fairly 
II 
long private letter written from San Sebastian in Spain. asking· 
for an. expre.ssinn. of Sir Hercul.es' views on alrising at J"ohannesburg. 
63 T 
"with or without as9istane;e from outside." 
The High Commissioner asked Bower to draw up a memorandum 
upon which to base a suitable answer. This was not the first time 
that Bc:mer had been asked. to draw up a memorandum on the u·itlander 
situation. When in England in J"anuary, lS9~he had warned Fairfield 
an.d :Meade of the extreme probability of a rising on the Rand and 
64 
at Fairfield's request had written down., his views on. the. matter. 
Hence. hi.s memorandum for Sir Hercules was practically a repetition 
of the one written in Fairfield's room. 
It stated "that a rising was probable; that I thought it 
would be pred·dudicial to British interests, if a cosmOpolitan 
republic we.re formed; and that nine out of ten of the J"ohannesburgers 
would be against the British Flage or anything that would bring 
them under the hatjed rule of the Colonial Office. I. also referred 
to. the High Commissioner ordering a cessation of hostilities 




conspirator or statesman? 
211 
194 - 195 
19 
and going up as arbitrator.tt 
Sir Herc\Ues discus sed Cha.mb er lains letter and Bower's 
memorandum with Rhodes.'? ''The resu.lt of this discussion 
with Rhodes was that amendments were made in my proposal reply. , 
I do not remember then all, but their tendancy was to make 
things mora explicit and less vague." Bower recollects that 
"it was stated that the High Commissioner would do his best 
' 
tor the. British flag, but had n.ot much hope of success •••••• 
it was proposed also to hold a plebiscite by order of the 
High Commissioner for the election of a Transvaal consituent 
65 ' 
assembly." 
Bower~s version ~the reply to Chamberlain is wholly 
corroborated by the actual State. Paper "from. the High Commissioner 
to the Colonial Secretary" which is quoted in full by Cl-e.rvin. 
who wonders whether the document, in the High Commissioner's 
66 
name,. "was not drafted by his able Secretary Sir Graham Bower." 
Rhodes was in agreement with the opinions embodiecl. in 
the State Paper to Chamberlain. He knew that among the 
Ui tlanders there was a marked lack of appreciation. of the. 
Colonial Office; moreover his most immediate ambition. a 
67 
loose economic federation among the South African States.-
was dependant upon the overthrow of Kruger and the elimination 
68 
of J.B. Robinso~~ not upon forcing Imperial control on the 
Johannesburg revolutionaries. Nevertheless)the revolwjtionary 
movement, on the Rand, finally collapse.d because. of a persistent 
65. Bower 
66. Garvin 
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rumour that tTamesonts force - with the full approval of Rhodes -
69 
would march in under the Union tTack. What could have been behind 
this rumour~ 
On November 5th - the day bet'ore the Protectorate was :finally 
' ceded. to the Chartered Company - Harris called. Rhodes (this com-
70 
munication being number 6 of the "missingtt telegrams): 
We have. stated positive that results Dr. cTamesonts plan in-
clude British Flag. Is this correct? 
~ 71 
Jov.b On the t'ollowing day Rhodes replied:-
;\1~s' 
As to the English Flag they must very much misunderstand me 
at home. I, of course, would. not risk everything as I am doing 
except _for the British Flag. 
Sir William Harcourt cross-examined Harris very thoroughly 
upon this cable~ in order to stress the. questi.onable integrity of 
a man who could state that he was risking everything for the Brit-
ish. Flag, in spite of a det'inite undertaking with the. Reform C:om-
72 
- itte.e that the revolt woul~taka place under the Union cTack. But' 
no attempt was made to find. out from Harris whom, in England, 
Rhodes had been assuring that. "he would. not risk. everyt.hing, except 
far the British Flag." 
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Harris cabled Rhodes, very agitatedly:-
•••••••••.• from information received know there is great 
danger Philli.ps Leonard they can or may be doing busin.ess wi th• 
out assistance from B.S •. A. Company and also indepently British 
Flag. It would have serious effect on your position here. I 
say this oonfidential.73 _ 
To what extent this cable was motivated by Harris t conaern 
about the price of his Chartered shares, it is impossible to say; 
but he is very definite that to act independently of the British 
Flag, wouJ.d seriously impair Rhodes' position in Eng-land. Some-
one, with great influence, might. not merely withdraw his support., 
but might actually thwart Rhodes • coup defain' - and it is diffi-
cult to see whom - bar Chamberlain - could. have been sufflciently 
powe.rtul to do this. 
Moreover, according to Bower, the view expressed in Sir 
Hercules' State Paper "that nine. out. or ten Englishmentt were not 
-
in favour of the. British Flag, did not make muah impression on the 
C\ 
C:oloni.al Secretary. For,. on December 6th, cypher telegram was re-,, 
oeived from Chamberlain - marked. private and personal - which ap-
proved of the High Commissioner's proposals as contained in the 
State. Paper "but went on to say that, if the ~ohannesburgers would 
73 Br. Sel. c,om. Rep. Appendix 14 111 No. 32 
- 22 -
agree to accept the British Flag, they would be allowed to elect 
74 
their own Governor." 
In the light of the Colonial Secretary's insistenee upon 1.... 
. . 
Union J"ack, Bovler make.s an in terest.ing comment:- "Shipping returns 
tor. Cape Town showed, during the latter part ot 1895, an e:x:c-ess of 
1,100 ot arrivals over departures. Furthermore, ships were also 
arriving, once a month, at Durban from Australia bringing each 




Three days before the arrival of Chamberlain's cypher tele-
•95 
gram to Sir Hercules, Jameson, while at Mafeking arranging the 
details of the transfer of the Bechuanaland Police., had told 
F .J·. Newton - the newly-appointed Resident Commissioner of what 
re.main.ed of the Protectorate - his real reason for enduring the 
76 
fly-ridden heat of Pitsani. This secret. must have weighed heavily, 
I . 
for Newton ~ez:ed the first opportunity of going down to Cape Town 
to lay matters before the High Commissioner. Bower explained to 
Sir Hercules the cause of Newton's anxiety, but the interview was 
refused: '~"the whole thing is piraoy; I know nothing about it; I 
?7 
won't see Newton." 
5 ~h~~ec... Bower then asked Rhodes to allay Newton's fears - which he 
.;; 3 1\~ s-
did. Moreover, Gould-Adams had just arrived. back from England and 
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78 
Mr. Fairfield in London and discussed the whole thing with him." 
This statement of Bower surely implies some c:ommunication ,, 
between Gould-Adams and Harris with regard to the Jameson plan"; 
yet Harris declared upon oath that "C.olonel Gould-Adams had no 
information from_ me with regard to any matter connected with the 
79 
Enquiry·, except the details of the transfer of the Protectorate." 
Vih~ .. ,'li~~idence before the House of commons Committee, 
Bower described his interview with Rhodes regarding Newton, but 
. 80 
carefully omitted its more interesting aspects; for this interview 
had occasione~ a fresh burst of confidence from Rhodes: "He 
showed me a telegram he had had from Lord Grey and Mr M~uire. 
Th~ telegram reported an interview with Fairfield telling them 
to hurry up on account of approaching trouble with Venezuela. He 
also showed me a letter from Miss Shaw telling him that all the 
leaders were with him." Rhodes also informed Bower that 
"Chamberlain had told him he was to postpone his 'fireworks• 
81 
until at least a fortnight after the transfer of the Crown Colony." 
Bower insisted that Rhodes show the Grey~~aguire telegram 
to Sir Hercules; and Rhodes did so, for. on the following day, 
hand 
Bower saw him/the High Commissioner a 'flimsy piece of paper' 
82 
which he felt positive was the Grey-Ma9uire "C:ill:J~~WP.\b" 'fi7>h. 
Regarding the communications from his agents which Rhodes 
discussed with Bower --- the Grey-Maauire telegram was not 
78. Bower 
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produced, at the Enquir~ -~ nor has it been published since, but 
83 
Grarvin admits that it was sent off on December 20th~-r:here are 
two very similar cables from Flora Shaw which conf6rm to 
Bower's discription -one of the 12th December and one of 
the l?th December• Not only do these indicate the approval of 
the Colonial Office, but they contain a definite warning not to 
84 
delay. The cable containing the message from Chamberlain is the 
last of the "missing" series and was sent off by Harris on 
85 
November ?th - (the day after the Protectorate had been handed 
over):-
"Secretary of Colonies says you must allow decent interval 
and delay fireworks for a fortnight. 
ffor Harris, a fairly explicit cable and one which would 
have created a most delicate situation if produced, at the Enquiry. 
however, Bower's statements are best supplemented. by 
taking events and communications in their proper sequence, bearing 
. ~",in mind, when examining the evidence, that ~uss Shaw stated 
.89'Q~ .. 
· at the Enquiry, that she did not know that Rhode~ was taking an 
86 
active part in the Uitlander movement; and that Chamberlain,in 
his despatch of 4th .trebruary 1896} stated that "in the long run 
the opinion had gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean 
87 
to risk a collision with the government." 
83. G-arvin 
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First, in the chain of evidence, is a cable of _ December 
88 
12th from Flora Shaw to Rhodes:-
Delay dangerous; sympathy now complete; but will depend 
very much upon action-before European Powers-given time (to) 
enter a protest which as .lliurope.an situation considered serious 
might paralyse government. 
The European situation does not appear to have been particu~ 
larly dangerous on December 12th, 1895; for Miss Shaw, in her 
evidence, mere.ly stated that, when she sent that particular cable. 
89 
"things on the continent looked uncomfortable." 
However, the exigencies of the New lmperialism were. inevitably 
or Anglo-German 90 
incompatible with sustained Anglo-FrenctVcordiality and, it should 
also be noted that, at this time, there was increasing friction 
between England and America owing to the Venezuela- British Guiana 
91 
boundary dispute. 
Miss Shaw, when examined on this cable, was very voluble 
indeed; the following being a fair example "I meant the sympathy 
here was, I thought, complete with the grievances of the 
Johannesburgers; that is to say the I though it was understood -
that they really were s~fering very ·considerable grievance and 
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The Committee was, however, most forbearing and eventually 
its patience was rewarded by the assurance that the views expressed 
in the cable were entirely her own: "I never at anytime gave the 
Colonial Office any intimation about the plan and I never,~at any-
time. received from the Colonial Office any imtimation about the 
93 
plan." 
It was, of course, due to this cable· of Miss Shaw that 
94 
Jameson• s urgent message. to Rhodes of December 12th, 1895!-
••••• let J.H. Hammond inform weak partners more delay more danger 
eC'. 95 
D~ Was relayed to Frank Rhodes with the addition :-
~ 
••••• the London Times also cableS confidentially to effect that 
postponement of meeting would be a most unwise course. 
On December 9th• Chamberlain had gone up to Birmingham, but his 
under-secretaries kept him well posted. On the 16th, Meade wrote 
concerning an interview between Flora Shaw and Dr. Leyda who had 
since left for the Continent; while Fairfield who had been sounding 
Rochfort Maguire reported that nothing would occur in Johannesburg 
93 Br. Sel. Com. Rep. 
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before the New Year but "Maguire will know more in a few days and 
I 
will see me again ••••••••••••••••••••. ···•••····••••••••••••••···• 
Dr. Harris will be at the Cape tomorrow or the next day and develop-
96 
men.ts of th.e situation are likely to follow." 
;Mt''\)et. The following day, Flora Shaw cabled Rhodes:-97 
IMS" 
Held an interview with Secretary Transvaal, left here Saturday 
for Hague, Berlin, Paris; fear in negotiations with these parties. 
Chamberlain sound in case of interference European Powers, but have 
special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately. 
In reply to the Hon. W.L. Jackson's tactful questioning, 
Miss Shaw explain~d that the reference, in the cable, to the 
Colonial Secretary had been considered "desirable", because, when 
Chamberlain too; office, it had been suggested he was a little 
98 
Englander. But she did not explain the connection between 
Chamberlain'"s potentialities as an Empire-builder and Dr. Leyds' 
negotiations on the Continent. 
Regarding the last twelve words of the cable, Miss Shaw stated 
that "One of the under-secretaries - Mr. Fairfield - in the course 
of a hypothetical conversation had said 'Well,. if the Johannes-
burghers are going to rise, it is hoped they will do so soon• •••••• 
96 Ga~~iru 
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and I, having the spec-ial knowledge in my own mind that the rising 
was going to take place, felt that it gave me right to say to them. 
99 
that I believed that they had better do it, immediately." 
The C:ommittee ae:cepted unreservedly, that Fairfieldts conversat-
ion with Miss Shaw had been just idle chatter. Butt his purely 
hypothetical. interest in the Uitlande.r unrest is hardly compatible 
wlth his close association with Rhodest agent Maguire. 
e'c. -
on Wednesday, December 18th, came the publication of Presiden.t 
Clevelandts announcement that the United States had oonstituded 
herself the. well-armed arbiter of the boundary dispute between 
100 
Venezuela and British Guiana. 
101 
· Whereupon Meade wrote to his chiet:-
t 
I propose to hold over the telegram to Robinson as to Dr. Leydsts 
supposed. intrigues, till I hear again from. you, as, when you direct-
ed it to be sent, you had not seen President Clevelandt·s message. 
Perhaps as we. shall have to face. German opposition you_ may wish the 
Uitlander movement to be postponed i'or a year or so. Fairi'ie~d 
thinks he could get thi.s done through Maguire, without compromising 
yo.u. He. thinks there are not many of the important men who are 
heartily in favour oi' this movement, though, if rushed by Rhodes, 
99· Br. Sel. Com. Rep. 
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they will no doubt join actively. 
102 
Chamberlain replied the same day:-
•••••• It must be noted that the American affair cannot become 
serious tor some time •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Now, as to the Transvaal, might it not come. off just as the 
cri ti.ca1 time., if it is postponed now? The longer it is 
delayed the. more chance there. is of foreign intervention ••••• 
It seems to me that either it should come at once or 
be postponed for a year or ~wo at least ••••••••••••••••••••• 
if Fairfield can make the situation clear to Maguire. I should 
like him to do So; then the responsibility must rest with 
Rhodes and we had-better abstain even from giving advice. 
ul! Fairfield saw Maguire and learnt that, according to 
recent bulletins from South Africa "Johannesburg would begin 
to move in about ten days. It is now too late to de.ter action 
103 
for a year.~ So he told Rhodes' agent that the sooner the 
revolt took place the better. 
The cable from Maguire and Grey arrived at Groote Schuur 
late on December 20th. Beit was staying with Rhodes, having 
102. &arvin 72 
103. ~rvin 73 
There: is an interesting postscript to this letter from 
Fairfield to Chamberlain ~Maguire says that South African v.alues 
have now reached a (downward) point at which it is thought by the 
best authorities in this City that the news of a row can have no 
other than a favourable effect.~ 
30 
arrived at the C~e, together with Harris, three days previously. 
)cc ,on December 21st J'e.meson received this heartening message. from 
5 104 
Harris:-
A. Beit has telegraphed Lionel Phillips urging instant 
flotationnew Company. I have telegraphed also Col. F.W. Rhodes 
same effect •.•••• ••..............................•..........•..• 
Bower strongly disapproved of this imporT~~'YJparticular~ 
as the watning enthusiasm of th/ Ui tlanders was becoming apparent 
even to Rhodes. "I told Rhodes 'We are weakening our future 
position by hurrying them now. We are making ourselves partisans 
not arbitrators• Rhodes became a.mgry and said I was dislpyal to 
105 
my chief Chamberlain who was hurrying him up." 
An indication ot wavering purpose is th~ aable from Frank 
Rhodes requiring assurance from his brother. that the "Chairman" 
106 
would "accompany him dn day of flotation." Bower makes no mention 
.. . 
of this cable, but it was established at the Enquiry that the 
107 
word "Chairman" referred to. the High Commissioner ;though both 
Rhodes and Bei t ·Stated in evidence that the necessary assuranaes 
had been sent to the Reform Committee without first consulting 
108 ' 
Sir Hercules~ been Mowever, it has been seen from the ~eminiscences 
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and also that he was in communication with Chamberlain as to 
his course of action in the event of an Uitlander rising "with 
or without assi.stance from outside. tt ......_ the. correspendence, ~ 
the existence of which was suggested, in the letter to Fairfield, 
109 
which Hawks~ read at the Enquiry:w 
You know and I do not what has passed between the High 
Commissioner or his Secretary and the Colonial Office.. 
'5 Bowe.r re:oords the arrival of further instructions to Sir 
Hercules from Chamberlain in a cypher telegram which arrived 
late on Thursday December 26th --- by which time Leonard and 
110 
Hamilton were wall on their way to Cape Town to postpone the 
re.volution indefinitely and Heany and Holden were hurrying to 
Jameson with the: Reform Commi tteet s stri.ct instructions not to 
111 
budge fromPitsani. 
Bower apparently remembered only the main points of the 
112. 
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117 
That same day Harris cabled J~eson:-
Lionel Phillips telegraphed to A. Beit the following message-
it is absolutely necessary to delay floating, if foreign subscrib-
ers insist on floating without delay anticipate complete failure. 
Presumeably the phraseology is that of Phillips not Harris; and 
that when Phillips said "foreign subscribers" he. meant "foreign 
subscribers"; that is supporters. outside South Africa, e.g. Maguire 
-
or the insistent Miss Shaw who had telegraphed that Chamberlain 
wished it done immediately. At the Enquiry, Harcourt aske.d Rhodes I 
whether he thought the "foreign subscribers" might be himself and 
118 
Beit. Rhodes shrugge.d his shoulders and said. "I should think so" 
L' ~. On Sunday December 29th, the High Commissioner informed 
Chamberlain of the collapse of the Uitlander revolt in a cable 
119 
which reached him, at Birmingham, towards the evening. 
But, in certain London circles, Uitlander ineffectuality had 
~ec. been the chief topic of conversation for the. previous two days. 
j 120 
On Friday, December 27th, Harris had cabled Flora Shaw:-
Everything is postponed, until after 6th J'anuary. We are 
ready, but divisions at Johannesburg, and.., on th::; .:J"ri ·:::·~- ._,. ·t '_; 1 
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CAr-J' \)~ * Fri J"J. e\1.-hi~ I 
.D.Fairfield had met Hawksley "who said that he and his friends 
-were being much chaffed in the city about the fizzle of their 
revolution" and who. moreover t "was concerned that Jameson migb. t 
_manipulate a revolution". Fairfield.' s letf~f reporting this news 
___1Q Chamberlain arrived, on Sunday morning. 
~ "'"" At 5.30 on the Sunday afternoon the Colonial Secretary called 
' 122 
Oe~ Sir Hercules Robinson:-
5 
(strictly confidential) It has been suggested, although I 
do not think it probable, that an endeavour might be made to force 
matt.ers to a head at Johannesburg by some-one in the service. of 
the Comp~y advancing from the Bechuanaland Protectorate. with 
Police y Were this to be done, I should have to take action under 
Articles 22 and 8 of the Charter. Therefore, if necessary, ••••• 
remind Rhodes of these articles and •••••••• that he would not 
have. my support and point out the consequences which would follow. 
This cable is No. 2 of Blue Book C7933 and that from the 
High Commissioner to c-hamberlain Yb,~fiordabove is No. 3. In the 
same letter to Omanney of 11th December, 1905. Bower refers him 
to the originals of these cables, as he says the: Blue Book versions 
123 
are rather different. 
121 Gtar.vin 
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At (are Enquiry, Chamberlain admitted that his cable warning 
Sir Hercules that, in the event, of an unprovoked incursion into 
the Transvaal, Rhodes need expect no support had been occasioned 
by certain forebodings of Fairfield-. But he ascribed these to 
124 
an article in - of all things - a financial newspaper. 
It would naturally have been rather unwise to state the true 
source of Fairfield's information; tor the less that was revealed, 
at the Enquiry, of the constant communication, during the weeks 
prior to the Raid, between the Colonial office and Maguire and 
Hawksley- the better. 
Maguire, it should be noted,. told the Committee that "he was 
125 . 
not kept informed" of events in South Africa. But as has been 
seen from the letters between Fairfield and Meade. and Chamberlain, 
he was kept very well informed either through direct communication 
with Rhodes and the Reform C.ommi ttee or through cables via the 
firm of Wehrner· Beit • 
.• ';c. It was from this firm that Flora Shaw, on the afternoon of 
Monday,. December 30th,. heard the news that Jameson had crossed the 
border. She told the House of Commons Committee that she had re-
ported this information to the Colonial Ofi'i.ce,. with all possible. 
speed.,. but was most emphatic. that this was the only occasion on 
whlch she had. conveyed informa.tion to the c-olonial office about 
125 
the: t\Jameson plan '1• 
Meade immediately informed Chamberlain who h&d telegraphed 
124 Br~ Sel~ Com. Rep~ 
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Your telegram received, are·you sure that Jameson has not 
moved. in consequence of collapse,. 
Some two. hours later, Chamberlain. rece·i ved from Sir Hercules the: 
offi~ial intimation of the Jameson Eaid. 
The High C:ommissioner had been told- Gf the inroad by Bower 
early that morning (30th December) and. had apparently received 
the news quite phlegmatically with the remark: "But perhaps 
C-hamberlain. has sent him in - or may approve· his going. He is 
. 128 
such an extraordinary fellow." 
13 Late: on Decemb~r 31st Miss Shaw receiv·ed the. well-known cable 
. . 'l2f 
from. Rhode.s:-... 
Infol:m Chamberlain tba t I shall get through ckllright if. he: 
supports me; but he must not. send. cable like. he. sent to High 
Commissioner in South. Africa. ~oday the crux is, I will win and 
South. Africa will belong to Eng:land .• 
Rhodes. v.rhen he sent off this c:.able.,. had nbt seen. C:hamberlaima 
commun-ication to Sir Hercules of Sunday,. December 29th; but Bower 
ha.d. sent a note c~ontaining; a rather free vers-ion of it to Groote 
'130 . 
Schuur. ··This is given in th.e: Appendix. to Blue Book C806S of. 
1896, but not commented upon,. in the Reminisc·ences .• 
127 Blue Book C7933', 1896 .;... No • 4 
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This cable fromRhodes was one of those of whose existence 
Miss Shaw had completely forgotten,. when she first appeared 
before the Committee of Enquiry. However she, very simply and 
efficiently, disposed. of attempts to question her upon it by 
stating that, as she was convinced it had originated. with Harris, 
131 
and not with Rhodes, she had completely disregard.ed. it. Harris, 
of. course:, had conveniently disappeared and could not be question-
ed upon this cable. 
But, it was obvious that, whatever the outcome of the Raid, 
C,hamberlain couldr.~.\"\cbf support cTameson. Earlier on December 31st, 
"132 
he had writt~ to the Prime Ydnister - Lord Salisbury:-. . 
.....•.••.• This is a flagrant piece of filibustering for which 
t.here is no justification that I can see •••••• If it were sup-
ported. by us, it would justify the accusation by GerlDE:Uly and 
other powers tha.t, having 'first attempted to get up a revolution 
in a friendly state and· having faile.d, we had then assented to 
an act of aggression •••••••••••• It is worth noting that I have 
no c.onfidence. t.hat the force now sent is strong enough to beat 
the Boers. 
In o.ther word.s, not only did considerations ot foreign policy 
call for repudiation of cTameson, but also considerations based 
upon an appreciation of Boer prowess i~ guerilla warfare. Yet, 
131 8r. Sel. Com. Rep. 
132 G-arvin 
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at the Enquiry, Chamberlain advanced. in his defence that, when the 
. Raid. took plac.e ,, he had denounce.d it and done what he could to stop 
it, even though "all the. information tendered to us was to the effect 
. 133 
that,. if we would hold. our hand,. the Raid would succeed." 
.Je.c. That same day {Dec.embe.r 3ls.t) , the Reform Committee,. with 
belated ini tiativa., prepared f.or a possible: Boer attac.k on J'ohannes-
134 
burg; Bower and. Hofmeyr drafted. the. High C:ommissionerts proclamat-
135 
ion condemning J"ameson t:s action in the name of the Q.ueen and 
Rhodes,. still bent on doing his best with the wreck of his carefully 
136 
laid plans~ telegraphed Flora Shaw:-
Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High C:ommissioner 
to proceed at one:e to Johannesburg,. the whole position is lost. 
High Commissioner would receive· splendid rece.ption and still turn 
position to·England's advantage,. but must be instructed by cable 
immediately. The instructions must be specific as he is weak and 
will tak:e no responsibility. 
This is the secon.d of the cables whose existence slipped 
Miss Shaw's memory. It is interesting that these. two. oable.s are .. 
the. only ones sent her by Rhodes and. that the:y both ass.ume that 
she is a trusted intermediary between himself anct. the Colonial office. 
133 Br. Sel. C'om. Re:p. 
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When questioned on this communication, Miss Shaw said she 
,· 
had taken no steps whatever upon recei-ving, it, because the 
C:oloni.al office was already pursuing the course. of .action ad-
. . .,~7 
'Vocated by Rhodes. 
Y ·.:n. On January 1st, Ohamberlain cabled Sir Herc.ules Robinson 
that he should "intimate to Kruger his intention of' proc;eeding 
I~ 1 
to Pretori.a. as peace.-maker" and the. High Commissioner and Bower 
prepared. to le:ave the: following day. 
Miss Shaw on January 1st sent a eable to Rhodes, regarding 
the contents of vvhich she was most vague: "something. to the effect 
l~Ct 
that C'hamberlain was very angry;" but which acost her £2.15.0. I 
Furthe.rmore., on Harris' instructions, she published the "letter 
1/.j.O · 
of inti tation" in the New Year's Day issue of the."" Times .'1 But, 
while J'ameson' s gallant attempt to save the: Ui tland.er women and 
children: was being cheered in. the Lon don streets 1 his column was 
advancing upon Krugersdorp under the watchful eye of several com-
panies of Boers. 
In his discussion of events after the surrender at Doornk.op 
Bower lays further charges against C'hamberlain. and Sir Hercules 
Robinson:·- both the Colonial Secretary and the High C:ommissioner 
were implicated in the Raid plot; ye·t the former, after attempt-
ing unsu.ccessfully to prevent an Enquiry into the. Raid, a:ontri ved 
by careful prearrangement to render it inef'fecti ve:; while the 
latter not only took refuge in denial,. but adopted the attitude 
that he hacl bee·n deceived. by those whom he trusted. .. 
137 Br. Sel. C'om. Rep. Shaw . 9758 • 
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The first phase. of the Kruger - Chamberlain issue is inter-
prete.d by Bower as a determined effort on Chamberlain"s part to 
prevent an investigation into the cir~umstancas of the Raid -
and an eq~1ly de.tirmined e.tfort on the part of Kruger to force 
an investigation. Biased as this interpre.tation. probably is,. it,. 
neve.rtheless, deserves consideration. For,. however importunate 
the demand.s fo.r an Enquiry on the part of the Radicals and. Liberals 
141 . 142 
in England and the. Atrikander Party in the cape·. Colony, the 
chief: agi tater was und.oubtedly the: T.ran'sv.aal government, either 
directly - or indirectly through the money which Dr. Leyds was 
143 . 
spending so effectively in Berlin. and Paris. The Transvaal had 
the. advantage of being the injured party and. Kruger, his mind 
fixed on the abrogation of Clause lV ef the London Convention, 
was determine.d. to press that advantage to the utmost, parti~ularly 
as he himself' was pre.tty well convin.aed there had been collusion 
between Rhodes and Chamberlain. 
Bower states "Kruger had_ good. reason. to believe that 
Chamberlain was in it and
1 
if he o.ould.. establish the fact
1 
he could 
repudiate the Convention and backed. by Germany, the Free State 
144 
and the Cape Dutch aha1lenge England.tt 
It is Bower''s opinion that a:hamberlain was und~cided just 
how to Lvd<JL an Enquiry; "whether by promoting a war or in 
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alternated with inquiries after the health of Mrs. Kruger." 
The G'olonial Secretaryt s despatches, during the first months 
of 1896·, d~-)1.~(-F\d~CliJ pre.sent a very co-ordinated policy as 
regards the Transvaal. He certainly seems eager to keep the Boer-
Uitlander quarrel alive. In the v:e.ry cable deprecating Jameson• s 
actions- his first despatch to_Kruger, since the official news 
or the Raiq - he draws attention to the need for Uitlander reform; 
146 
which is hardly tactful. However, a few weeks later, we find him 
147 
suggesting that Kruge.r visit England , presumably hoping that J in 
return for certain concessions - concessions which will not in-
elude the abrogration of Clause 1 V - the· Transvaal President will 
waive an Ellquiry into the Raid. 
On ~anuary 18th 1895, Chamberlain telegraphed to Sir Hercules 
148 
Robinson at Pretoria:-
•••••••••••• that the majority of the population (of Johannesburg) 
is composed of Uitlanders and that complete exclusion from any 
share in the·crovernment·is an admitted grievance which is publicly 
recognised •••••••••••••••• ~•· 
149 
On danuary 15th he telegraphed again:-
There can be no settlement until the questions raised •••••••• 
are disposed of. The people of Johannesburg laid down their arms 
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in the belief that reasonable concessions would be. arranged by 
your intervention; and until these are granted, or are definitely 
promised to you by the President; the·root·cause"of·the·recent· 
disturbance.s will remain .••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Bower stresses the tense atmosphere in the Transvaal capital, 
during the weeks immediately after the Raid,-- far more intract-
able than Kruger himself were his commandants who urged war even 
150 
after the disarming of the Uitlanders; and he appears convinced 
that Chamberlain would not have chosen this. seemingly inopportune 
time to press for Uitlander reform, if he had been averse to the 
prospect of an immediate Anglo-Boer war. 
"Sir Hercules, when I pointed out that Chamberlaints policy 
meant war, urged that he was only a Post Office; but t argued 
that he was more than a Post Office, with the result that he 
151 
snubbed Chamberlain." 
On J"anuary 27th Cb.amberlain - possibly a little chast·ened 
by the "snubbing" instructed the High Commissioner to give 
Kruger "in the name of Her Majesty's Government a cordial invitat ... 
- . 152 
..fk' ion. to visit, England." Yet a fortnight later he incurred acute 
.1. 153 
re~6Transvaal displeasure by publishing prematurely a long 
> 117bdespatch to President Kruger which, apart from dealing exhaustive-
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154 
ly with Uitlander grievances suggested. "Home Rule for the Rand." 
Days before Kruger actually ::ecei ved the despatch,_ it was being 
widely discussed in Pretoria. 
Bower rem.arks acidly ''This was described as a d.eparture in 
the. New Diplomacy. It was certainly a new departure, not only 
155 
in diplomatic methods, but in the ordinary rules of courtesy." 
However, Kruger was not prepared to visit England and certain-
ly not prepared to forego anu Enquiry without a guarantee that the 
vi tal Clause 1 v- would be repeole.!. But on this point Chamberlain 
remaine.d obdurate; so negotiations for the visit to England 
never got beyond the tentative stage and, on the return of 
Dr. Leyds from Europe,. early in April'" finally fell through; 
for Leyds, says Bower, was, if anything, even more convinced than 
Kruger that Transvaal interests could best be served by pressing 
156 
for an Enquiry. 
To what extent this conviction was based. on the mutterings 
of the friends and relatives of the imprisoned Uitlander leaders -
or of the prisoners themselves 





it is impossible to say. 
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At the meeting at Groote Schuur in -october 1895, Rhodes 
presumably told Hammond, Phillips and the rest what he told Bower, 
a few days later viz. that Chamberlain approved of his plans. 
We know that Rhodes used the cables from Harris to promote his 
conspiracy; so, obviously, among those who saw then were the 
Uitlander leaders. Beit was, unf9rtunately not asked at the 
Enquiry to what extent he had communication with Phillips, while 
in England, and what the nature of these communications had been. 
There is also the telegram. sent by Garrett - the Editor of 
157 
the Cape Times to the Johannesburg Star:-
January 1st - You must expect· and not misunderstand a pro-
clamation putt.ing Jameson formally in the wrong. Imperial author-
ities have no other course; dontt let this weaken or divide you. 
This is merely for your information. 
In other words do not regard the proclamation as a.breach of 
faith on the part of the C.olonial Secretary; it is a mere matter 
of form. According to Garrettts evidence, before the Cape Committ-
ee of.Enquiry, this telegram was sent off, after consultation with 
. leo•:trl¥lt)iotve~Jt <A f-rrr CuY\~\A\~~~¥' wdt ~ 5r~the.~r- 3t)wt;,sz 
However, there can be very little doubt that, during the 
weeks prior to the Raid, the Uitlanders were under the impression 
157 Cape Co~ Rep~ 
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t.hat the conspiracy had. c:ha.mberlain•·s support - and that the 
maj ori t.y of them considered such support an excellent thing, pro-
vided it stopped short of forcing the British Flag upon them. 
There can be just as little doubt that, during the weeks after 
the Raid, Johannesburg was alive with rumours of Colonial Of:Lice 
complicity in the plot. 
P.R. Botha states, in his "Staat~dige On.twikkeling van 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek onder Kruger en Leyds" :- "Die mense. 
in die Transvaal was oortuig,. dat die Ehgelse regering kennis ge-
159 
had hat V-U die invalsp~ne." 
Bower assures us that "one of the Reformers, not a leader, 
whose name I prefer not to give 'peached' to the: Transvaal govern-
'160 
ment. That is he implicated Chamberlain but not Sir Hercules." 
At all events, by the end. of~ April 1896, Kruger and Leyds 
. were more de~ermined than ever, that there must be an Enquiry. 
·--··--· --------------
Bower left for Englan.d •. at the end of March 1896. While in 
London, he saw J·ameson who was awaiting trial; and was assured 
that the. "Hawksley9cables (i.e. the cables between Harris and 
161 
Rhodes) would not be produced at the trial.' 
159 P.R. Botha 
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This is particularly interesting in view of a statement in 
the biography of Sir Edward c·larke K.C. who was briefed to defend 
J·ameson: "Clarke had formed the opinion. from the secret documents 
, put before him. in the J"ameson case that the British Government was 
. 162 
i:~rv:ol ved in the attempt." 
Clarke himself says in his biography "I had been. shown all 
the. messages and letters which had passed be.tween. London and South 
Afric.a; and between Johannesburg, Cape T.own and Pi tsani. But I 
re.cei ved definite instructions that no question was to be asked, 
or any fact elicited. that might suggest that any department or 
official of the British Government knew of the preparations for 
163 
the enterprise,. or was directly or indirectly re.sponsible for it." 
T.he Attorney-General could give. Sir William Clarke instruct-
ions as to the manner in which he conducted. J'amesonts defence; 
but. no-one. could stifle the rumours whic·h, during the months before 
the· Trial-at-Bar be·came increasingly persistent. - rumours to .. the 
effect that Rhodes' supporters could prove the complicity of the 
Colonial Office rumours which steadts "Review of Reviews" by 
no means di.scouraged. 
On that visit to England, Bower also took due· note of the 
astonishing rapport between C'hamberlai.n and Sir William Harcoutt • 
• • • • • • • • • • . • which indicated. Chambe.rlain' s careful preparations 
162 D. Walker-Smith·&. E:. O'larke - Life of Sir Edward Clarke 
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. '164. 
for the. now almost inev1 table Enquiry. 
Harcourt seems, from the start, to have been prepared not 
to press f·or any disclosures as to the part. played by the 
c·olonial Office in. the Raid plot; provided he could se.cure a 
. 165 
'..;torough-going and unanimous condemnation ot Rhodes." But,_ 
at the conclusion of the Enquiry, not content with the very 
thorough c.ond.emnation in the Committee's Report,. he apparently 
kept up his tirades against Rhodes and those who assisted him in 
' 
his "Empire-jerry-building projects" and tho.se: who were his black-
. mailing agents. For) almost three years after the: Enquiry. Hawks-
- · . '166 I 
le.y wrote: this very indignant lat.tex to Lewis Michell-1\hJt~ ~kv, 
24th Fe.bruary, 1900. Will you read c;arefully in the Times 
of last We.dnesday - the· 2lst instant - the report of the Debate 
in the·. House of. C.Ommons. See particularly Sir William Harcourt t s 
speech. ............... Sir Willi.am. Harcourt in calling Rhodes agents 
blackmailers and e;ontending that they sent cables knowing they 
were false· is, I half expect., trying to goad. us into. publishing 
the cables· and my-· subsequent corre.spondence: with tb.e. Colonial 
Office ••••••••••••• You know Rhod.es that he d.oesn't care about 
this Minister o.r that, but woul.d not embarrass o.r smirch Her 
Majesty's or· England• s fine name by owning that the troo.ps. were 
brought dovvn,. in order to aid the Transv.aal rev.olutionaries with 
164. Bower · - 289; 293 
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t.he knowledge: and sanction of Mr. Chamberlain. It was said, 
in the Report. of 1897, and. is now repeated that though· the· 
cables implie.d knowledge or complic.i ty, in faa:t the.y •••••• 
did not represent the truth • • • • • • • • • • • • The question I ask 
myself is this - when Rhodes comes to Engl~d as he will. and 
takes part in English politie:s will this Committee. Report and 
this conde:mn.ation be a bar to his joining say L.ord Rose·bery' s 
Cabinet?l6? •••••• ·••.• I am half inclined to publish everything 
on my. ovm·responsihility· and·dontt ·think Rhodes would·teally be 
sorry ••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••• 
LB(~.~ bJ::}"~t<. Only a few weeks after his return to the Cape, Bower again 
. \.8&! Jo . 
'\ sailed for England, on this occasion. accompanying Sir Hercules 
who was going over for health reasons. 
Under normal circumstances it was obviously no.t sound policy 
for bo'th the High Commissioner and the Imperial Secretary to be 
away at the same time; but the. Cape Committee of Enquiry had ·just 
been appointed and there was the rear that Bower might be called 
upon to give evidence. This fear was strengthene.d by the fact 
. 
that Sir J"ames Si vewright had made a speech. in the Cape House of 
Assembly in which he, to all intents and purposes, accused Chamber-
lain or complicity in the Raid Plot. though,. as Bower is C:areful to 
16? Lord Rosebery was still,. at th~ltime, the unofficial leader 
o.f the Lil1eral Imperialists. 
- 49 -
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point out t "he ex.one.rated Sir Hercules as all did." 
Sir Hercules' health having become worse, on the voyage 
home. he· took t.o his bed. upon arri ~al and. ahamberlain had, 
pe.rforca to v.isit him. at his hotel. Bower says of this inter-
view::" I do not know what passed but Chamberlain who previously 
had been 'dangerous as an. enemy - untrustworthy as a friend and 
fatal as a colleague' su.d.deM\ly be.came 'a very nic~e: fellow - a 
169 
really able man. wi.th lots of pluck!" 
By this time Raw~sley had. allowed the vital dossier of cables 
out of his possession. Bower who was constan.tly se.eing either 
Meade or Fairfield. describes the. impact. on the Colonial Office. of 
Sir Richard. Webst.er"s verdic.t. that. - e.v.en though mo.st of the cables 
S?)H,~hJti\~ . - . 
,might with some ingenuity be/\ aa:c:ounted for - the Grey-Maguire 
communic-ation in o.orrelation with the correspondence between 
'170 
Chamberlain. an.d Fairfield was damning e.vidence;. 
The chief concern. of the. Coloni.al. Office was that the Cape 
Committee: of Enquiry might make a det.ermined. e.f':fort to get. posse.ss-
i.on. o~ these cable-s. At one:. stage the likelihood of t.hi.s was c.on-
side:re:d so. great. that there: was. talk. of Chambe:rlain re:signing; 
but fortunately Stevens of the Chartered aompany had had the pers-









outside the. jurisdiction of the Cape Colony. 
Bowar also tells of a "cyphe.r cable message" which was sen.t 
to the. ac.ting Dnpe.rial Secretary at the Cape. The reply came to 
him in c.ypher and wa.s hande.d over to the. Colonial Office. What-
ever the import of the reply an assurance. that the Cape Coram-
ittee c:ould not obtain the Harris-Rhodes cables or merely that 
the C:omm.ittea woul.ci not touah upon the question of: Colonial Office 
'172 
complicity - Chamberlain dici not re.sign. 
This is ~arvin's rather more pallid version of Chamberlain's 
of:fer to resign upon reading the 'Kawksley"· cables: "H.e felt it 
his d.uty to t.ender his resignation to the Prime Minister. Lord 
Salisbury did. not dre.am_ of e.ntertaining that offer. The Govern-
173 
ment was prepared to stand or fall with the Colonial Mlnister." 
Subsequent conversations, at the. Colonial Office, with 
Chamberlain, Meade and Fairfield made Bower realise that the 
Colonial Secretary now felt sufficiently secure. "to carry things 
with a high hand.;" that he would certainly not admit his com-
plioi ty and that, if by some means the age.nts of the South African 
Republie thwarted. his aff:orts to suppre.s.s all incriminating e.vid-
174 
ence~,. he would go to war. 
"A White Book. had been compiled (No. 5~8 African) datedJ'uly 










This White. Book was a very long indic tmeil t of the Transvaal 
and was prepared as a brie.f for a war e.gi tation in case of 
175' 
expos!a .• " 
Towards the middle of August Sir Hercule.s - rather less 
dropsicat as. a result of tha ministrations ; of the p}l.ysicians -
and Bower returned to. the Gape .• 
••"" The Rouse of COirl.4-aons Comrni ttea had. by then, been 
J~, appointed ~d ~he Enquiry was sc~eduled for February ofnthe 
. 121'foll.owing ye:ar. George Wyndham- a member of this Committee 
was another passenger on the: ship. H.e was onnhis way to Rhodes 
,\ ,. be 
to secure: a promise that the Hawksley cables wouldjsuppressed; 
in exchange Chamberlain would guarantee the Charter of the 
17~· 
B .s .A. Company. 
one cannot imagine Wyndham having much difficulty in 
pu.rsuading Rhodes to withhold the. "Hawksley" cables. Rhod.e.s 
was aware that an expos' of the Colonial Office would, in all 
probability, bring about the dovmfall of Salisbury~s Ministry 
and that the Chartered Company would fare ill at the hands of 







The same fear for the safety- of the Company- which 1ent 
fervour to Rhodes~ denials of Colonial Office complicity 
ena.b t·tded H.awksley - the Company~ s solicitor - to, sacrifice:, 
with fairly food grac.e., the re.putations of Rhode,s, J'ameson . . . 
and Willoughby ·to the national interest. Though there were time.s 
when, . in spite of the .. Company, his eagerne.ss ta win the case 
+or his clients outweighed his pa.trioti.sm; as for instance: his 
efforts to get information from Bower abou.t the. correspondence 
between Sir H.ercules and Chamberlain. Moreover, it was Hawksley 
who drafted the le.tter which Willoughby sent to the war Office-
the letter which, affirmed the "honest and bona fide belief~ 
.~t~ 
that Her Majesty's Government knew and approved -and Hawksley, .. 
at the Enquiry, was so eager to put in a good word for Rhodes 
that the Corondttee could not hustle him. out of the witness box 
quickly enough. 
H.owever>the letters stolen from Hawksley's office which 
were published in the Independance Belge on 5th J'anuary 1900 
show that, both before and during the EnquirT, Hawksley; acting 
in the interests of the Company, co-operated very sati~factorily 
with the Colonial Office and wi. th the Select Committee • 
53 
Although very little notice has been taken of this 
correspondence there have never been any q.ueries as to it's 
auth~nticity. The "Morning Leader" leaflet in which these 
letters were originally published in England, is printed as 
an appendix to W .J'. Stead's pamphlet "Joseph Chamberlain 
Conspirator? or Statesman?" The :following two letters are 
among the most interesting:-
Goldsmith Building, 
·Temple. 
7th August, 1897. 
Dear Mr. Hawksley - Can Mr. ·c:harles Leonard come down to the 
House of Commons at 5 O'clock. The Committee meet (priyately) 
at 4.30; and I could see Mr .• Leonard immediately after the 
meeting breaks up. John c. Bigham. 
2nd April, 1895. 
Hawksley to Rt. Hon. W.L. J'ackson I send you a memo. about 
Siz; John Willoughby. Will you put the points in this memo to· 
him and· also the. two first paragraphs in the enclosed print ••• 
I. am giving Mr. Nicholson further pfints for circulation. among 
the Committee. 
In al~ fairness to Chamberlain it must be said that he was 
apprec.iati V:e of the way in which the "Rhodes Group" co-operated 
throughout the travesty of an Enquiry. In a speech in the House 
of Commons on July 26th a speech which~arvin describes as a 




as a "man of honour't, a statesman" who has done the greatest 
service to the British Empire, but who has made one gigantic 
mistake"; and ended by assuring the House that "the Govern-
177 
ment did not intend to abolish the Charter" Thus he succeed-
ed in. removing the sting tromHarcourt's "thoroughgoing con-
damnation of Rhodes" or in the words of A.G. Gardiner: "effect-
ually torpedoed the report of which he was the signatory and 
178 
reduced the Raid Enquiry to derisi.on." 
-------..--··-·-.,.,.,.""'--.. - ._.....,- -:..-.-""0 
More interesting than the letters from the stolen "Hawksley 
dossier't are certain communications which Bowe.r recei 'Ved. from. 
Fairfield. an.d Meade· on his return to the c:ape. 
•179 
The letter from.Meade is dated 19th October, 1896:-
My dear Bowe.r Thanks for your cypher note. The Holloway 
officers have been allowed to resign. They urge.d that they acted 
"bona fide" in the belief that the steps taken with the knowledge 
and assent of the Imperial authorities and that they were inform-· 
ed by Dr. Jameson that this was the case. Dr. Jameson. has also 
written to the Colonel of the Blues to say that he acted on "the 
telegrams now in the possession. of Mr. Hawksl.ey" which were shown 
to the officers. These two letters were communicated. to the 
177 &arvin 
178 A.G. Gardiner 
179 Bower Letters . • 
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Sir Robert Meade to Bower • 
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• .._ Adjutant-General who calmly proposed to send a Staff Officer 
to the prison to hold and Enquiry. 
The important query here is had Jameson, before he decided 
to invade the Transvaal, seen or been told of the Grey':"'Maguire 
cable with it's rather explicit instructions from the Colonial Office?, 
) 
for ttthe cables now in the possession of Mr Hawksleytt did apparently 
include the Grey-Maguire communication. 
It is very difficult to find justification for his action 
in ~6- cables from li':lrris to Rhodes. They indicate approval only 
of the ''Jameson plan." which was essentially a plot to ensure a 
successful revolt on the Rand but was not a plot to make a 
"lawless foray " in.to the South African Republic. 
l However, Meades letter, shows that the War Office did make 
an attempt to investigate the question of Colonial Office complicity 
in the Raid, but that it was eff'ecti vely quashed by Chamberlain. 
Jet, At the end of October, there was a letter from Fairfield:-
5 
Dear Bower, 
. You will know by this time, of stead~s 
announcement that he is going to·ffurn the whole story of the Harris-
Rhodes cables into· a xmas number. Everyone is talking of it and 
the thing will. now, of course, come out. I think we are all~ 
rathe~ glad it has came to this. Nothing could be worse that the 
system under which Rhodes• partisans were able to go into raptures 
180. Bower Letters 31.10.96. E. Fairfield to 
Bower. 
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their own patriotic si1ence.s. Whilst all the time spreading 
their own ve.rsion of the matter far and wide. 
Fairfield the. vary efficient" if rather, colourless,. C:ivil 
Servant. seems a lit.tle tired of being the subject of gossi,p in 
t.he London C:lubs, while,. as a luke-warm Imperialist, he. is 
probably q_uite uneoncerned about. the fate of the. Salisbury 
Ministry. So put an end to all the gossip; le;t "the whole thing 
come out"; publish the Harris-Rhodes cables and.,. above all,. 
pubJ.ish the correspondence. between Chamberlain (at Birmingham..} 
and Fairfield and Meade. - an.d establish that the Colonial Office 
offieials in their dealings with. Rhodes. agents were merely ac·ting 
'181 
under the orders of the. Colonial. se.cretary. 
However, a week or a fortnight later, Bower received a. 
"broken-hearted letter from Fairfie~d which he entreated me to 
burntt. In this. letter Fairfield said that tthe. would have to c.on-
form. his evidence to that of the others"' or else: Chamberlain would 
repudia..te him and that the·: corraspondence· between Chambe:r.lain,. 
182 
Fairfield and. Meade during December, 1895 would be suppresssed. 
In his let.ter to Omanney of 11th December, 1905 Bower refers 
to this letter from Eairfield and to the fact that he burnt it as 
183 
req_uested. 
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If Chamberlain had hopes of still being able to shelve the 
En.quiry, they were dashed by the publication at Christmas time 
of "The History of the IV".!Ystery" Stead~s version of 
Chamberlain's part in the Jameson Raid plot, in the guise of a 
rather dreary late-Victorian fantasy. 
By the time, Parliament re-opened in February, the chief 
topic of conversation in the lobbies of the House of ~ommons, 
in White's Club, in the newspaper offices and most certainly in 
the Embassies - was whether or not Joseph Chamberlain had 
"indeed been in it up to the neck." Yet the astonishing fact is 
that th.ose who considered Chamberlain guilty were, nevertheless, 
quite prepared to acquit his chief agent·· at the. Cape - Sir Hercules 
Robinson.; and this was the case not only in England, but also at the 
Cape, as has been noted in connection with Sir :James Si vev">'rights 
speech, and in the Transvaal. P.R. Botha states: "Rhodes, Bower, 
Newton en. andere het agter die. Ho~ Kommissaris se rug om gewerk 
en hulle handlangers laat verstaan. dat Sir Hercules die voorgenome 
. . 184 
opstand goedk.eur en steun; wat seker nie die geval was nie•tt . . . 
so it seems that not even Dr. Leyds attached any special 
signi.ficance to the "Chairman"· telegram. Nor apparently did the 
note which Bower wrote Sir .Hercules, very early on December 30th 
184. P.R. Botba 419 
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1895 occasion. any comment. 
Dear Sir Hercule.s Could you come into town early? 
There is, I fear, bad n.ews from Jameson. He seems to have 
disobeyed Rhodes and taken the bit between. his teeth. 
It was not suggested. that this communication would hardly have 
been. intelligible to a sleep-befuddled Sir Hercules at 6 .a.m. in 
the morning, if he was under the impression that Jameson was at 
Pitsani for the sole purpose of guarding a still non-existent 
railway. 
For that was the High Commissionerts story--Rhodes 
hi.s trusted. friend had grossly deceived him.; not once, during 
the. weeks prior to. the Raid had he given any reason for the t'orce 
at Pitsani - bar the guarding of the railway; not once had he 
hinte.d. Qi'" any connection between this force, and the Uitlander 
unre.st. 
No-one doubted hi.s word "all sympathised. with the 
dying old man who complained that he had been tricked and deceived." 
Even. Sauer's Party rallied around. him, for hera was an opportunity 
186' 
of imputing to Rhodes yet an.otb.er perfidy. 
Sir Hercules' strength, of course, lay in the assurances 
of both Rhodes and Bower that they would protect him. Bower 
stateS that, when the High Commissioner and he returned from. Pret-
oria on January· lOth, 1896 there. was a note from Rhodes who 
had sailed for England, the; previous day, warning him.. nthat he had 
l85. 
186. 
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defend_ed Sir Hercules, at the Cape, and would do so in England. n 
Rhodes' qefence of Sir Hercules was to admit that he-had 
'discussed with him the possibilities of an Uitlander revolt and 
and s'U:ggested that,. in the event of such a revolt, it might be 
necessary forhim to mediate; )- but to deny that he .had ever told 
#ke +.U~:k.:C~~\:SS~ that. he-- was ~ncouraging_ the. Uitlander s to 
-Q . 188 
re.volt or to what use he intended. putting Jameson's force • 
. A:t the end of Marc.h, just before Bower sailed for England, 
Sir Hercules discussed with him "what line he would take in Eng-
11 
land respecting the. question of previous knowledge .• 
\' I told. him that I had connected the troops with Johannesburg 
and was not going to abuse Rhodes behin.d his back. 
Sir. Hercules got out the corresponden.ce which was in his 
private letterbook and said "There is nothing here about the 
troops" ......... • ••• He also said P,e had never discussed the subject 
with. me. and I bad no right to say he h·ad done so. 
I admitted that I had not discussed the question,_ but had 
believed. he was doing so with Rhodes, as he always shut me up. 
He said_ "If you say you connected the· troops with Johannesburg,. 
no-one will believe that you did not dise-uss- it wi.th. me. It is not 
'189 ,, 




This, of course, is just what did not occur for people were , ... 
Bower 
Br. Sel. Gom. Rep. 
Bower 
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quite ready to believe: that Bower had purposely withheld from Sir 
Hercules the, disclosure.s made to him. by Rhodes. 
In October, 1896, Bower, at the request of tha Colonial Office 
submitted. an official a.ccount of his momentous interview with. Rhodes 
190 
twelve months before. A copy of this statement is among the 
Bower letters -with a note in Bowert-s handwriting to the effect 
191" 
that portions of i.t were diet a ted by Sir Hercules. 
I.t seems that the fol}Gu;ling paragraph in particular was 
insiste.d. upon by the High Commissioner:- "The Governor did not as 
was his usual practice when he received important intelligence. make 
any mention to me ~-such a disclosure. by Mr Rhodes an.d it is clear 
tha.t Mr Rhodes ami tted to te.ll him what he said to me. This Mr 
Rhodes voluntarily stated in a conversation that took place in my 
room. after the Raid, saying, he was glad he had kept the governor 
192 
out of it. tt 
This paragraph has -bee~n rather well thougnrout it provides 
complete official exoneration for the High Commissioner, without 
demnding from Bower the supreme sacrifice viz. an admission, in 
black and white, that he had deliberately decei ve:d his chief. one 
feels compelled to admit that Sir Hercules in spite of his 
advanced age and his dropsy - was the only effi.cient conspirator 
of them. all. 
Bower was ordered home, late in December. Before h.e left,. 
190~ Bower 
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Sir ~ercule.s ~ again went o.ver his position regarding fore-knowledge 
of the conspiracy. " I told. him that, so far as I was concerned, 
. ' .. 
'J, 
I could say.;'quite truthfully that I had not discussed with him. waht 
193 ,, 
th.e troops were, intended to do and would say so." 
on his return to England, Bower saw George Wyndham who told him 
that Chamberlain had no inte.ntion. of producing at the: Enquiry the 
cyp~r corre.spondence between himself and the: High. Commissioner and 
194" 
that the Committee would not ask for it. 
Bowe.r also; v:isi.ted. Meade. wh.o. was ill. Mea.de:. assured him the: 
Committee was not the "fonn.idable thing the world though+ it was. 
Chamberlain and Harcourt were excellent friends and understood each 
195 
other." 
:aowever, whe:n the Enquiry took place, Harcourt had, at least, to 
put up a show of formidability. He di.d not have much s.uccess with 
Rhodes who apparently drunk stout and munched. sandwiches an.d answered 
196 - . .. .. . . 
questions quite,. imperturbt;ibly ) bu~ Bower - somewhat agitated and 
unhappy in his role of scapegoat - was ''badgere.d and baited and c 
19?" 
confused. 'til he hardly knew· where he was." What little semblance. 
of. poise remained. when Harcourt had finished. with him was completely 
shattere.d,. when Labouchere who, at: that stag.e., was still embued with 
193~ Bower ~ 331 - 3'32 
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a deadly keeness 1 proceeded to call him a li-ar. 
Bower might have argue.d that by misrepresenting the truth 
he was ruining his own career in order to save the repQtations 
of others; and more.ove:r tha.t he~ had been warned E2! to tell the 
truth. For had not Wyndham. told him, that all. correspondence 
and. conversations which implicated Chamberlain and Sir Hercules in 
the conspiracy must be. considered as confidential; if he should, 
~ . - ..-
inadvertently. or othe.rwiseJ di.~ge anything "Old Rosmead will 
be carrie.d into the box. in his b.andages li1Ce the dying C. kc:.+lc.~ 
. . . - 199. 
and will give. you. the lie.. He will be backed. by Chamberlain. tt 
198~ Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
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Before summing up the evidence, three things must be made clear. 
Firstly - By the time Chamberlain. took office, the Transvaal 
was looming very large as a potential danger to British supremacT 
in South Africa. Not only was Kruger• s anti-British, pro-Germa.n 
policy becoming increasingly detrimental to British prestige and 
1 
to the advancement of the New ImperialisD4 but his persistent 
refusal to grant the Ui tlanders the economic: and poll tical free-
dom they desired might,. in the near future, provoke a revolt which, 
if Great Britain were not very careful, would result. in the estab-
lishment of an Independent Uitlander Republic, hostile to British 
2 
interests. Sir Henry Loch, when in July 1894, he ordered the 
Bechuanalan.d Polic.a to concentrate,_ at Mafeking, in case the.. 
commandeering crisis resulte.d in an outbreak, on the Rand was, 
3 -
presumeably providing for these same contingencies - viz. 
(.a) that Germany might need. a convinc:i:ng demonstration that Great 
Britain would brook no interference in south Africa and 
(b) that Uitlander impetuosity might require a little curbing 
t...:Ld tbirte-en months later the situation in the Transvaal was con-
siderably more acute; Kruger and the Kaiser were in closer ac-
4 - 5 
cord and the Uitlanders were becoming increasingly rebellious: so 
it was as important to Chamberlain as to Rhodes that Kruger• s gov--
ernment be o~erthrow.n - and probably o~ even greater importance 
to Chamberlain than to Rhodes that this be achieved under - if 
t)r1't-~ L. 
not direct - at least indirect~auspices. 
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Secondly - While Bower has been, t.o date,. Chamberlain's severest 
critic,. his most enthusiastic protagonist has been J.L. Garvin. 
Bower draws a sharp distinction between. the Raid and the 
Raid plot. It never for a moment occurs to him that anyone bar 
Jameson was implicated in the former; but he. contends that 
C'hamberlain. ~ implicated in. Rhodes~ plot to overthrow Kruger. 
Garvin,. although he is very clear on certain points: viz. 
that Chamberlain was a noble soul; that Rhodes was a "Colossus" 
with fee.t of clay; that Jameson was a "Stock-exchange" hero; that 
Harris would have been more at home under a damp stone; that 
Flora Shaw was an "admirable" woman; that Hawksley was a black-
mailer - and so forth, does not make it clear that he appreciates 
the essential difference. between the ;fameson Plan and the; ;rameson 
Raid. Perhaps he considers the Raid an integral part of Rhodes' 
original plan for his vindication of Chamberlain consists merely 
of ex.onerating him from complicity in the actual Raid .. 
He quotes- Chamberlain as stating to Meade: "My case is that • 
while I knew all about the revolution, I knew nothing of anything 
6 
so mad as Jameson.' s Raid_." 
He quotes Chamberlain as stating to Flora Shaw: "The fact. is, 
I can hardly say what I knew ancl what I did not. I did not want 
to know too much. Of course, I knew of the preparations,. the pre-
cautions,. in view of the expected trouble- in J'ohannesburg, but I 








According to Garvin, the issue as regards the Pitsani force 
was as follows:-· either ~ameson was occupying a convenient posit-
ion both to guard the railway. and to march in and support the 
High Commissioner's arbitration, should Sir Hercules call upon 
8 
him; or he was preparing to make a raid on a t'riendly state. 
Therefore, because Chamberlain had no foreknowledge of the actual 
Raid,. he. was,. also unaware of Rhodes' real reasons for wanting the 
Protectorate.. Garvin does not discuss that the intention was that 
Jameson should march in and ensure the success of an Uitlander 
rising; and that it was this fact which Harris was instructed to 
confide. in Chamberlain. 
It will be. remembered that the Report of the House of Commons 
C.ommittea condemned Rhodes as the instigator of the plot. and Bower 
for his complicity in the plot; but stat.ed that neithe.r Chamber-
lain nor Sir Hercules Robinson were made aware: of the plot during 
its development. Garvin quotes this paragraph from the C:ommitteet s 
9· 
Report- yet, at no stage, does he make clear exactly-what the plot 
was,.. nor does he prove: that Chamberlain. was unaware of it. 
Thirdly- Chamberlain obviously could not support an un-
10 
provoked incursion into the. Transvaal such as Jameson~"s Raid; 
but his denunciation of Jameson is no criterion· for the fact that • 
he did not know and approve· of Rhodes' plans to secure a successful 
8~ Garvin 
9. Garvin 
10. P.R. Both a 




revolt on the Rand. 
The first point in the summing up is - That 1 t would 
appear that, when Chamberlain handed over the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate to the Chartered Com.pcmy he did not unwittingly 
givo Hhodes what he wanted i,e-. the section ot Bechuanaland 
wh1.ch borders on the Transvaal and the Border Police, when he 
wanted 1 t i.e. by November 7th; but that he was aware o:f' Rhodes' 
intention to use the force on the Transvaal border to support 
an Uitlander revolt, 
\ 
'];o br.iefly recapitulate: Harris, after his first repreaentat\t.(\}t\.,t 
to the Colonial Otfice for the transfer ot t.he- Protectorate, 
telegr~~Rhodes ·that Chamberlain is "heartily 1n symptithy'" • 
ftwill do anything to as'sist''; provided nhe officially does 
not know of the plan"; but cannot promise an immediate transfer, 
However Chamberlain interviews Khamo. Sebele and Bathoen; informs 
then that the Protectorate will~ncorporate~wi thin Charterl~~ 
" 
and ad visA!~ them to disous s adequate reserves etc \vi th the 
B.s.A. Company. He then departs for the Continent. from where 
he granta Rhodes administrative rights over a str:ip of territory 
sufficient for a "jumping-off ground" and writes a confldential 
letter to Sir Hercules Robinson asking his opinion of the 
possibility of' an Uitlander revolt "with or wi tb.out assistance 
from outside" tJpon his returD, he is interviewed by Grey 
whom we know is in the plot; Harris has a heart to heart talk 
with Fairfield; Rhodes is assured that as regards Meade, Fairfield 
and Flora Sbaw "We have these solid"; and• within the time limit 
set by Rhodes, the session of the Protectorate and the consequent 
disbanding of the Police is an accomplished fact and Rhodes receives 
5 
a cable to tbe. effect that "the Secretary for the Colonies says 
you must allow decent interval and. delcy fireworks for a fortnight." 
Chamberlaints refusal to settle the Protectorate question 
immediately does not,. as Garvin considers, ttclearly prove that he 
10 
was an obst.acle not an ac.oomplice". He was bound to give the 
BechuanC\ chiefs an opportunity of laying their ease be.fore him; and, 
at his f~!?t in.terview with the chiefs, he left them in no doubt as 
to what we.s to be the ultimate destiny of the Protectorate. Nor 
are his disagreemen~s with Rhodes in conn.ection with the details 
of the transfer settlement any indication that he had no foreknow-
ledge of the plot. In fact, as Stead points out, it is far more 
likely that Chamberlain, knowing how vital it was that the Protect-
orate should be handed over at a given date, sie:ze.d the opportunity 
to drive a hard bargain. But, even if, as Garvin contends, these 
two aspects of the negotiations indicate. "lack of cordialitY'' 
between Rhodes and Chamberlain, they are far outweighed by other 
a:onsiderations. 
It is very hard to believe. that the Colonial Office,. in the 
autumn of 1895, would have paid absolutely no attention to a 
"guarded allusion" to the desirability of having troups. on the 
Transvaal border. Chamberlain knew that a revolt was brewing on 
the Rand. Even Garvin adnrl.ts "that all the information of the· 
12 








can safely disregard the statement, in Chamberlaints despatch of 
February 1896, to the effect. that "in the long run. the- opinion 
gaine.d. groun.d that the. Ui tlanders ·did not mean to risk a c-ollision 
with the. government;" and take for granted that Chamberlain was 
most concerned. about the situation on the Rand and; therefore, 
would hardly hav~. been completely impervious to the hin.ts of 
Rhodes agents, even. though, as R.I. Lovell affirms, Harris was. 
13 
"the so.rt of man one snubs on sight." 
Furthermore the most reasonable interpre:.tation of the cables 
sent by Harris to Rhodes in connection with the negotiations 'for 
the. protec:torate - particularly the, cables which were withheld 
at the Enquiry - is tha.t Chamberlain knaw and approved of Rhodes• 
real purpose; for wanting a force at Pitsani. 
Garvin., however, disagrees with this: "Chamberlain handed 
over the- border-strip and. the police· with the sole purpose of 
promoting the railway "though" h.e no doubt recognised that the 
new force to be formed, at Pitsani,. might serva as :t'irst aid 
14 
should intervention. by the British Government become necessary." 
But H.arris actually mentioned the words "J'ameson plan":- on August 
21st he ca:hled "You are aware Chamberlain states Dr. J'amesont s plan 
Ill1:1St not be mentioned to him"; an.d again on. November 5th" We have 
stated positive. that results Dr. Jamesonts plan include British ,, 
Flag and the assenee or the Jameson plan was not that the forc-e on 





on the border be thexe merely to support the High Commissioner's 
arbitration,. in case: of an Uitlander revolt; bu.t. that it should 
march in. and actively assist the Uitlanders in overthrowing the 
governmen.t. 
According t.o Bowertc Rhodes:,. as a re.sul.t of' the. cables f'rom 
Harris, was defini.tely under tha im.pre.s sian that Chamberlain knew 
and approve.d of the plot; so either Harris was deliberately mis-
leading Rhodes. - and it i.s diff'icult to see what hi.s motive. 
Q;oul.d. have been - or elsa Chamberlain did,. in fact,. know. 
The most int.e.resting of all the: Harris-Rhodes te.le·grams,. is . . 
mentioned by Bower. viz .• the .. aolonial Secretary'"s message· that in 
ord~r to ensure a "decent intexva.lrt the.. "firework:s.tt must. be dalay-
ed for a fortnight." To Rho.des and Bower this meant a warning 
from Chamberlain:. that the: connection between. the. transfer of the 
Protectorate. and. the rising against the_ Transvaal government must 
no.t appear too blatant; and one. would be very hard pu.t to in.ter-
prat it in any- other way-. H.owe.ver • Garvin t s v:e.rsi on. ia that. the 
refexenc.e to .. "fire.works" was a jest an ahamberlain"s part whic:h 
15 
"was turned. into. a calculated me.ssage: behind. hi.s back. tt 
. . 
T.hfb qu.e·stion of the; integrity of Harris is,. of c.ourse, a most 
important orie. Garvin talks about. the "highl.y-colouxed summaries't 
15. Garvin 112 
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of con-versations at the Colonial Offi~e, sent by Harris to Rhodes -
Lovell quotes Hammond of the Reform Oommittee as da~laring that 
17 
Harris was an "unmitigated liar". But it is vary diffi~ult to 
find anyone. remotely connected. with the. Raid_ conspiracy who did 
not have. an infinite capacity for distorting tha· truth,. except 
po.ssi bly Bower) when confronted. by Labouchere. 
The fact remains that., if Harris was deceiving Rhodes,. then 
so were Maguire,. Belt and Hawksle.y,. for H:arris consulted them. 
ei the.r individually or collect.i vely before sending off the. cables; 
moreove.r Maguire and Hawksley were. actually- present., at certain or 
H:arris'" oonsultati.ons with C.hamberlaints-Gecrataries. 
Admit.tedly • the Colonial Secretary seems to have had. very 
little direct communication with Harris,. Hawksley and ~aguire,. 
preferring to usa Fairfield:. and Lord_ Grey as middlemen.. But, it' 
Chamberlain,. when he departe.d. for his "Vacation,. kn.ew nothing or 
what his triend Lord Grey knew - of what Hawksley,. the great 
friend of Fairfield knew,. then. why did he write the High Commission-






"with or without assistance from.. outside"; and why did he, with-
in a week of returning)hand over the Protectorate when, owing to 
the unrest in the Transvaal, there could be no more inopportune 
moment for withdrawing the Imperial Police from the. Bechuanaland 
? 
border •. 
The evidence. may not be considered overwhelming; but it 
must be remembered that the "HawksleY" cables provided sufficient 
testimony to convince Sir Edward Clarke of the complicity of the 
Colonial Office and, until the Harris-Rhodes cables are refuted,. 
the assumption that Chamberlain did not hand over the Protectorate 
unwittingly seems a justifiable one. 
The sec-ond point in the summing up is that the appearance of 
the "British Flag'" as. an unwelc-ome factor, in the plans of the 
Ui tlanders, suggests Colonial Office complicity in the Raid plot. 
If only Rhodes and his henchmen had been concerned in the 
plot, the.. "flag" question would not have arisen, for Rhodest as 
has be-en. seen, would never, at any stage of the conspiracy,. have 
attempted to force the Union J"ack upon the Ui tlanders. 
However on November 5th Harris called Rhodes: "We have· stat-
ed positive. that results Dr. J"'amesont s plan included British Flag? 
Is this correct?" 
And Rhodes replied: "As to the British flag they must very 
- 10-
,much misunderstan.d. me at home:. I, of course, would not risk 
everything as I. am doing except for th~ English flag.« 
Again,. a few days before leaving England,. Harris called a 
warning ''that to do busine.ss. independently of British flag would 
have serious effect on your position. here." 
The most obvious implication is· that an assurance: regarding 
• the. British flag would have: been required only by the Colonial 
Office. ~ and, moreover, that. Rhodes who was perfe~tly· aware: that 
the Ultlanders di.d not want. the Union Jack would have given such 
an. assuranc.e: only to some-one whose; support he badly needed., some-. . -
one: who was in a position to thwart his plans viz .• the Colonial 
Secretary. 
It will al.so be remembere,d that,. in a cypher message to 
Sir Hercules of December oth, 1895, Chamberlain. offered the: 
Uitlanders the right to elect their own governor, provided they 
hoisted the British flag·; in spite of Sir Herculest statement in 
his State:-Paper of Novembe~r 4th that nine out of ten Ui tlanders 
did not want C:olonial Offic.e rule. 
Here again., the e.vidence: is not completely: irrefutable; But 
the "flag" rumours arose out of assurances which Rhodes. and Harris 
. . . . 
gav.e to some-one. "in the: know" and it is: difficult to see whom 
bar c:ha.mberlain. - that could have been. 
The third point in the summing up is that the correspondence 
·condue.ted by members of the c·olonial OffiC>e·., during the· weeks 
immediately before the Raid,, yields fairly strong circumstantial . . ' 
ev:idence indicative: of fore-knowledge·. of the: Raid plot. 
-,11 -
I have spoken openly ·co E. Fairfield and I have accepted, if 
Colonial Office will transfer to us balance Protectorate with 
Police ?th November we will agree to any liberal police reserves 
to native chief's ••••••••••••••••• 
As regards the date mentioned by Harris-November ?th - Rhodes 
appe.ars to have stressed that November ?th was to be the latest 
40 
date for the acquisition of the Police. 
When Labouchere has trying to elicit from a very reluctant 
Harris some details of his "open"(.conversation with Fairfield, 
Chamberlain signified that he wishedcto read a letter from 
Fairfield, written to him, at Birmingham, immediately after the 
41 
conversation had taken place. 
Fairfield to Chamberlain - November 4th - You will 
see. that events are moving rapidly in South .Africa - Rhode.s, 
having accepted the responsibilities imposed on him, is naturally 
very keen to get the. Protectorate question settled and had been 
telegraphing all day to this end ••••••••••••••••••• Rhodes 
wants you then to authorise the Bechuanaland Border Police to 
enlist with the Company •••••••••• Rhodes •••••••••••• wants to 
get our people off the scene, as this ugly row is pending with 
the Transvaal. That I think is also our interest ••••••• ! do, 
not think there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will 
40. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
41. Br. Sel. Com. Rep 
Harris 8520 f'f' 
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progress •. 
Twelve hours before Leonard and Hammond arrived in Cape 
Town to inform Rbodes that the Uitlander revolt had "fizzled 
ou.t", Fairfield rec i ved the same information from HEW:ksley 
with the additional piece of news that Jameson might manipulate 
a revolution. In this connection, it is well to recall that the 
news of the actual Raid came to the ~olonial Office via Flora 
Shaw who had obtained it, at Beit.ts London Office. 
Like most of the docwn.entary evidence pertaining to the 
Raid, these letters are far from explicit, but Chamberlain 
certainly considered them sufficiently so to warrant being 
withhe.ld at the. Enq_uiry; and, undoubtedly the close accord 
e. 
between the London and of the con.spiracy and Fairfield does 
suggest complicity, in spite of the. fact that the latter was 
deaf. 
Chamberlain,. as was seen in connection with the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate negotiations, preferred to have no direct dealings 
with Rhodes,. agehts. Meade wrote on December 18th " ••••••••••••• 
if the movement is to be postponed, it must be done at once. 
Fairfield is confident he could do this without compromising 
you, should you wish it to be done." 
Chamberlain at Birmingham. - might not have been 
in such close touch with the conspiracy as was Rhodes at 
Cape Town. Nevertheless, a few hours before Jameson's troops. 
crossed the Transvaal border, he called Sir H~rcules to the effect 
that he could not support an unprovoked Raid into the Transvaal. 
So we have the following situation:- the Colonial Office 
knows that an Uitlander revolt might break out, at any moment; 
13 
it aacepts that Rhodes is the power behind the. Reform c·ommi ttee; 
it makes a point of being in constant communication with Rhodes t 
agents - yet Garvin apparently considers that "it aould not 
tl 
begin. to gues-s at Rhodes' plans, the obvious comment beiD:g, that 
apart from appearing rather incredible, this opinion. does n~ 
reflect very highly on the acumen of' Messrs Chamberlain, Fairfield 
and Meade. 
The fourth. point in the summing up is that the correspondenae 
between Rhodes and his agents, during December, 1895 provides 
fairly strong testimony to the effeat that the Colonial Office 
was implicated in the Rai.d plot. 
What Labouchere calls the "remarkable" cables between Flora 
-shaw and .Rhodes h.ave only o-ne logical interpretation viz that 
Rhodest plans had the support of' the Colonial Office, but that the 
Colonial Secretary wished them carried into effect as soon as 
possible. 
There is the aable of December 12th: "Delay dangerous sympathy . . 
now complete, but will depend very much upon action before 
European powers given time (to) enter a prote·st which as 
European ?i tuatigl'l aonsidered serious might paralyse Government" 
And the aable ol' December 17th " ••••••••• cllamberlain sound in 
case. of' interference European Powers but have speaial reason to 
beli.e.ve wishes you must do it immediately." 
It will be remembered that, at the interview of' December 
22nd Rhodes told Bower that he had had a cable from Miss Shaw 
saying that "the leaders were. with him." The same argument applies 
- 14 -
here, as in the case of the Harris-Rhodes cables either 
Flora Shaw was deliberately deceiving Rhodes. or else the 
Colonial Office. did. not know of the plot. 
' ,.-"....-"' . . 
It seems, therefore,. that when Rhodes cahled Flora Shaw, 
on December 30th, 1895: "Inform Chamberlain that I shall get 
through all right if he supports me", he had some justification 
for expecting support from the C:olonial. Secretary: There were 
the cables from.Harris assuring him that Chamberlain knew and 
approved and, no doubt,. the reassurances of Harris and Bei t, when 
they returned to the C:ape and. the assuran.ces of Gould-Adams who 
had discusse.d the plot with Fairfield. There were the cables from 
' 
Flora Shaw, and there was the Grey-Maguire telegram. 
The Reminiscences. and Garvin's "Life of Chamberlain" provide. 
ample evidence that this cable did exist, that it was, in fact 
sent off,. on December 20th, by Grey and. Mag\lire who reported an 
interview with Fairfield who had stated that,. on acc:ount of the . .. 
situate.d in Venezuela. the Uitlander revolt should be "hurried up." 
C:hamberlain' s instructions had, of cotirse, been that the. 
revolt should either be postponed for two years or else take place 
immediately; and. Fairfield
1
on hearing from .. Maguire that the 
situation, on the Rand, was such that the revolt could not be 
postponed, had told him. that the sooner it took place the better. 
So from Chamberlain's viewpoint the tele-gram does not present 
the issue quite fairly. Ne:verdh~less, the· Colonial Office sent 
to Rhodes, through his agents, a message. whose obvious import was 
that the revolt must be brought to a head in other words 
the Colonial Office not only knew that Rhodes was 
15 
trying to instigate a revolt on the Rand, but it was urging 
him. on. And Bower states that when, in June 189{), Sir Richard 
Webster examined the "Hawksley" cables, he considered that the 
Grey-Maguire telegram was "damning evidence", particularly 
when read in conjunction with the letters between. Chamberlain 
and his Under-Secretaries. 
The fifth point in. the summing up is that there do not 
seem to be any grounds for considering that Rhddes and Harris 
might have deliberately tried to implicate Chamberlain, in the > 
plot, in order to cover themselves. 
If such an attempt was made, it involved the deception not 
only of Bower and Sir Hercules Robinson, but also of the leaders . . 
of the Reform Committee, Jameson and, according to Meadtls 
letter to Bower, Jameson's officers; and it is very hard to 
believe that this widespread conviction that the colonial 
Office was supporting the plot could have been occasioned by a 
mere tissue of lies on the part of Harris and Rhodes. 
Moreover, this attempt of Rhodes and Harris to implicate 
Chamberlain in the plot and to deceive the conspirators in. 
South Africa must have had the connivance of Beit, Maguire and 
Hawksley who knew all about the contents of the Harris-Rhodes 
cables. and who were present at certain of Harrist consultations 
at the Colonial Office. The deception must also. have had the 
conni van.ce of Flora Shaw the import of whose cables is 
somewhat similar to that of the Harris-Rhodes cables, and th.e 







conni.vance of GoUld-Adams. For there is Bower's statement 
that Go~ld-Adams saw Fairfield in London, while the negotiations 
for the Protectorate were being carried on and that he tthaving 
discussed the whole matter with Fairfield" was able to assure 
N.ewton of the foreknowledge and approval of the Colonial· Office. 
Furthermore, Hawksley, four years after the Raid, was still 
keeping up the deception, when. he v~ote to Michell stating most 
posi.tively "that the troops, were brought down in order to aid. 
the Transvaal revoluntionaries with the knowledge and sanctionlof 
Mr Chamberlain. n· 
All of which reduces the conspiracy to rather unmanageably 
fantastic proportions. We have in addition certain other factors 
to conside.r:- the assurances of Bower that Rhodes sincerely 
believed Chamberlain knew and approved of his plan.s; the letters 
to Bower from Lord Grey and Sir James Rose-Innes which state that 
Bower has ta·ken the blame which rightly attaches to others; the 
· fact that all the important evidence was suppressed at the House 
of Commons Enquiry; Fairfieldsvery interesting letter to Bower 
in w.hich he says that tthe will have to conform his evidence 
to the rest,. or else Chamberlain will repudiate him't; the fact that 
the attempt by the War Office to investigate· the question of 
Colonial Office complicity was prevented; the close accord 
between the Colonial Office and Rhodes' agents during the· weeks 
immediately b~~a:o.~ the Raid and the fact that Rhodes received a 
message from the Colonial Offi~e that the revolt·.on·.the Rand must 
take place as soon as poss.ible. 
These considerations combine to render decidedly untenable 
the theory that a delibera.te attempt was made to implicate the 
1? 
unsuspe.cting Colonial Secretary in the Raid plot. 
---------------------~ The final point in the summing up is that it would. appear 
that Sir Hercules Robinson the chief represe.ntati ve at the Cape 
<if the Colonial Office had forelmowledge of the plot. 
Apart from. the "Chairman"· telegram.; Blue Books and Green 
Books supply no evidence, whatsoever against Sir Hercules, but it 
has been noted. that W.L. Langer and Cecil Headlam. both seem to 
think. that he ~. implicated in the Raid plot. 
Langer states: "There is no reason. to suppose that RobiBson the 
. 18 
friend of Rhodes was not fully iniated in.to the whole scheme" but 
he does not support his statement. He~dlam; fortunately, censures 
the High Commissioner in less vague terms. He, more.over, informs 
us in a footnote that "The events of those critical days have given 
rise to violent controversy and to the suppre.ssion or mutilation 
of some of the evidence:. The account in the text is based an the 
statement of some of those most intimately concerned whose: evidence 
19' 
is, as yet, umpublished." 
The most important evidence) however, is supplied by Bower, who 
states very plainly that Rhod~s, Lionel. Phillips and J·ameson discus.sed 
the.ir plans with Sir Hercules. Rhodes, on that morning in October, 
after he had c.onfided in Bower,. went into Sir Hercules t office and 
told him what he was plarULing to do - not only had Bower advised 
him~ to do this, but his brother Frank had refused to leave for 
Johannesburg, until the High Commissioner was informed of the 
co.nspiracy. 






himself; fpr only on this con.dition would Colonel Frank. Rhodes 
consent to proceed to a-ohannesburg to take charge o.f military 
20. 
operations'1 
Bowe.r, of course, was not present at Rhodes' interview 
with the High Oommis.sioner and, on. the following day Sir Hercules 
refused to discuss "there damne.d conspiracies of Rhodes an.d 
Cha.nlberlain"; but Rhodes afterwa~ds assured Bower"that he had told 
the~ High Commissioner everything." 
~ames on, according to Bower, interviewed the High 
Commissioner, early in November. Ag~in Bower was nOt present, 
but was afterwards told by J"ameson. that, at his interview with 
Sir Hercules, "he had taken care to satisfy himself that the High 
Commissioner knew everything." 
In support of this point Headlam quotes a paragrap~ 
from an article by Janeson published in the National Review of 
September 1933: ' . "Rosmead {re· Rob~nson) had agreed to take action, 
once we were there. He kne.w every detail of the arrangements. 
The night before I left for Mat eking •••......•• we went over tre: 
21. 
groun.d of our joint action. again." 
Bower states equally plainly that Sir Hercules was 
shown the .Grey-Maguire cable. When, on December 22nd, he was given 
this cable to read,. he told Rhod~s that the High Commi.ssioner 
must be informed of it; and, on the following day, he saw, Rhodes 






was the.. Grey-Maguire communication. 
Moreover, by this date, Sir Hercules had rece.i ved two 
comm.unicati.on.s from. Chamberlain. on the subject of an Uitlander 
outbreak the confidential letter which arrived, late in October 
1895, asking his opinion. on the. possibility of an. Uitlander ,, 
re,vol.t "with o.r withou.t assistance from outside; and the cable 
of December. 6th offering the Ui tlande·.rs the freedom to choose. 
thei.r own. Governor, provid.ed they would hoist the: British flag. 
While, three. days later; (26th Decembe .. r) 1 there was a cable from 
Chamberlain, giving the High Commissioner certain instructions 
as to his course of action, when ·the revolt brok.e out: "He was 
to consult the Secretary of state. for the. Colonies before issuing 
a proclamation; and he was to consult his ini,nisters before going 
u.p to Pretoria." 
Bower also mentions certain confidential communications 
between Sir He.rcules and Chamberlain, some of which presumeably 
were shown. to him, as he states that "he did not con.side.r himself 
justi.fi.ed. in making use of correspondence. which was shown 
to him only in a private capacity.~ 
Furthermore it has been. pointed out that the note which 
Bower wrote Sir Hercules, informing him of cTamesonts raid would 
hardly ha'tXe been intelligible. to someone ignorant of the plot. 
What detracts from the force of Bower's case. against 
the. High Commissioner is that he himself neither discussed the 
conspiracy with Sir Hercules, nor heard cTameson, Rhodes or 
Phillips discuss the conspiracy with Sir Hercules. Besides, 
however convinced he might have been that the 'filmsy piece of 
paper'" was the Grey-Maguire. telegram he either did. not or could 
- 20 
not veri.fy the fact. 
Neve.rthe,le.ss, during the weeks prior to the Raid, Bower did 
not experience a single qualm as to hi.s own fore1m.owledge of 
the plot, because: he was convinced that his chief Sir Hercules 
has also been told, bu.t that he did not want what would have 
be.en tan.tam.oun.t to an offLcial discussion on· the matter with 
hi.s Imperial Secretary. That Rhodes and a-ames on. were not telling 
the truth when. they assured Bower of Sir Hercules foreknowledge. 
of the plot is very hard to believe. The High Commissioners 
mediation, at the cri.tical moment, was such an integral part. 
of their plan:- that it is inconceivable. that they would have 
attempted to carry this plan into effect without first discussing 
it with him, just as i.t is inconceivable that Chamberlain, 
knowing of the plot) vyould n.ot have had some correspondence about 
it with Sir Hercules. 
Admittedly, the evidence which had been dealt with does 
not pro.vide positive proof in the shape of a signe.d statement 
by the High Commissioner and the Colonial se.cretary to the effect 
that they 1y!Q. been aware- of the plot; or a letter to Chamberlain 
from someone with an impeccable reputation, such as Lord Grey, 
stating "Rhodes suggests that a well organised Uitlander rising 
aided by troops Q~ the B.s.A. company could succ:essfully 
overthrow Kruger do you approve?" and Chamberlain.•s reply 
expressing his unqualified approval and conveying his blessing' 
) 
or a first hand account by Bower ei- an interview with the 
Colonial Secretary, at which Chamberlain declares "Of course I · 
21 
knew of Rhodes plans, but I have no intention.'of publicly 
admitting the. fact. If you are stupid enough to tell the 
truth, youwill have to take the consequencies." 
But, nevertheless, the communications be.tween Rhodes and 
his agents - Harris, Flora Shaw, Grey and Maguire - prior 
to the Raid, the most important of which were suppressed ~~ 
the Enquiry, and rle correspondence between Chamberlain and 
his Under-Secretaries, prior to the Raid which was also suppressed 
at the Enquiry provide. sufficiently strong evidence to 
support Bower•s contention that Chamberlain knew it,, approved 
of ~ and to a certain extent encouraged the Jameson Raid plot. 
Nor does there seem any reason to doubt that Sir Hercules 
Robinson was fully aware of the plot and of the role which he was 
to play in it. 
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